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ARTICLE III AND THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT
James E. Pfander* & Daniel D. Birk**
124 HARV. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2011)
ABSTRACT
Historically-minded scholars and jurists invariably turn to English law and
precedents in attempting to recapture the legal world of the framers. Blackstone’s
famous Commentaries on the Laws of England offer a convenient reference for moderns
looking backwards. Yet the generation that framed the Constitution often relied on other
sources, including Scottish law and legal institutions. Indeed, the Scottish judicial system
provided an important, but overlooked, model for the framing of Article III. Unlike the
English system of overlapping original jurisdiction, the Scottish judiciary featured a
hierarchical, appellate-style judiciary, with one supreme court sitting at the top and an
array of inferior courts of original jurisdiction down below. What’s more, the Scottish
judiciary operated within a constitutional framework -- the so-called Acts of Union that
combined England and Scotland into Great Britain in 1707 -- that protected the role of
the supreme court from legislative re-modeling.
This Article explores the influence of the Scottish judiciary on the language and
structure of Article III. Scotland provided a model for a single “supream” court and
multiple inferior courts, and it defined inferior courts as subordinate to, and subject to
the supervisory oversight of, the sole supreme court. Moreover, the Acts of Union
entrenched this hierarchical judicial system by limiting Parliament to “regulations” for
the better administration of justice. Practice under this precursor to Article III’s
Exceptions and Regulations Clause establishes that a supreme court’s supervisory
authority over inferior courts would survive restrictions on its as-of-right appellate
jurisdiction. The Scottish model thus provides important historical support for the
scholarly claim that unity, supremacy, and inferiority in Article III operate as textual and
structural limits on Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping authority.
I. INTRODUCTION
Jurists and scholars often view Article III of the Constitution through the lens of
the eighteenth-century English legal system, particularly as refracted by William
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.1 Supreme Court Justice Felix
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1
First published in England between 1765 and 1769, when Blackstone held the Vinerian chair at Oxford,
the Commentaries on the Laws of England enjoyed remarkable success in America. On the appearance and
publication of the Commentaries in America, see M.H. HOEFLICH, LEGAL PUBLISHING IN ANTEBELLUM
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Frankfurter gave voice to this preoccupation with England when he drew on the practice
of the courts of Westminster in defining the judicial power of the United States.2
Generations of American lawyers, before and since, have turned to the Commentaries for
insights into the content of the common law and the structure of the English court system
that was familiar to the framers of the Constitution.3 Today, as a result, Blackstone and
English legal structure provide essential starting points for scholars attempting to explain
the framing of Article III.4
Although inquiries understandably begin with Blackstone’s England, we hope to
show that they should not end there. As participants in an Atlantic marketplace with ties
to the commercial nations of the British Empire and Europe, the citizens of the newly
independent states were exposed to a broad range of ideas and influences.5 Among these
many influences, we have found evidence that the legal system of Scotland provided an
important—and thus far overlooked—model for the creation of Article III’s one supreme
Court, with jurisdiction in law, equity, and admiralty, protection from legislative control,
and a hierarchical superiority over inferior courts.6 Unlike the English court system,
which parceled out judicial power to multiple superior courts with overlapping and

AMERICA 26, 131-34 (2010) (2010) (describing the model of sale by subscription that was used in
marketing the Commentaries and treating its appearance as the beginning of the growth of a national
market for law books in antebellum America). On Blackstone’s life, before and after the Commentaries
appeared, see WILFRID PREST, WILLIAM BLACKSTONE: LAW AND LETTERS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
ENGLAND (2008). On his jurisprudence as a judge of Common Pleas, see Emily Kadens, Justice
Blackstone’s Common Law Orthodoxy, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1553 (2009). On the place of the
Commentaries in English legal history, see generally 12 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
(1938). For a nicely balanced account of Blackstone’s work and influence in America, see John C.P.
Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of
Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 545–49 & n.104 (2005) (collecting commentary on the Commentaries).
2
See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Raoul Berger,
Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 816 (1969)
(arguing that “it is hardly to be doubted that the framers contemplated resort to English practice for
elucidation” of Article III).
3
See, e.g., WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACTS OF 1789, at 32 (Wythe Holt
& L.H. Larue eds., 1990).
4
On Blackstone’s importance to scholarly work on the federal judiciary, see RITZ, supra note 3, at 32;
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL
L. REV. 393 (1996) (relying extensively on Blackstone and English legal authorities in exploring foundingera attitudes toward the separation of powers and the judicial role).
5
For recent attempts to situate the framers in the context of their more cosmopolitan world, see David M.
Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations,
and the Pursuit of International Recognition, __ N.Y.U.L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2010) (describing the
framers as aspiring to membership in the European community of civilized nations); see also Richard J.
Ross, Legal Communications and Imperial Governance: British North America and Spanish America
Compared in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: EARLY AMERICA, 1580–1815 at 104, 108–
09, 122–25 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2009) (describing a lively trade in law books
and many points of contact between colonial governors, assemblies, and courts and their counterpart
administrators in England).
6
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; id. art. III, § 2; id. art. I, § 8. We do not claim that Scottish legal thinking
was more important to the framers than that in England, only that the Scottish legal system may have had a
greater impact than has thus far been recognized in the scholarship on Article III. Cf. GORDON WOOD, THE
PURPOSE OF THE PAST: REFLECTIONS ON THE USES OF HISTORY [##] (2008) (cautioning historians against
too quickly proposing to isolate a single decisive influence on the thinking of the framers).
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coordinate jurisdiction and aspired to a judicial hierarchy that it often failed to achieve,7
the Scottish system had a single supreme civil court, the Court of Session, which presided
over all inferior civil jurisdictions.8 The Court of Session combined a supervisory
authority with the power to hear cases on appeal in law, equity, and admiralty.9 In
describing their legal system, Scottish legal writers including the influential Henry Home
(Lord Kames) consistently emphasized the importance of the supremacy of the Court of
Session, its power to supervise and correct the decisions of inferior tribunals, and the
hierarchical relationship between the supreme court and subordinate courts.10
Apart from its hierarchical structure, the Scottish legal system also differed from
its English counterpart in its relationship to the British Parliament. English courts,
though creatures of royal prerogative,11 acknowledged the sovereign power of Parliament
to remake the law and remodel English institutions.12 Blackstone, in particular, spoke of
Parliament’s authority in sweeping terms.13 By way of contrast, the Scottish courts
operated within a constitutional framework that was meant to shield them from
parliamentary control and alteration. Indeed, when between 1706 and 1707 the separate
nations of England and Scotland negotiated and adopted a Treaty of Union that would
dissolve their respective Parliaments and form a single, united Parliament and nation of
Great Britain,14 they included in their resultant Acts of Union included a series of
7

See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *30 (distinguishing between “courts of common law and
equity . . . and courts maritime.”); 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 194–264, 395–465 (1922); DAVID M.
WALKER, THE SCOTTISH JURISTS 229. See generally 3 BLACKSTONE, supra, at **37–56, 68–70 (describing
the superior courts of law, equity, and admiralty). Despite the coordinate quality of the superior courts,
England displayed some interest in judicial hierarchy. Thus, King’s Bench enjoyed relatively broad
supervisory authority over inferior tribunals; the Court of Exchequer Chamber sat as a college of all the
superior court judges to clarify difficult legal questions; and the House of Lords exercised appellate
jurisdiction over all the superior courts. See generally JAMES E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT:
SUPREMACY, INFERIORITY, AND THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 39–41 (2009) (describing the
comparative contribution of these tribunals in clarifying the law of England). But England lacked a single
superintending supreme court until October 2009, when the House of Lords gave way to the new Supreme
Court under the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005. [cite]
8
See HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES, HISTORICAL LAW-TRACTS 329 (Edinburgh, A. Kincaid, 1st ed. 1758); 5
DAVID M. WALKER, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SCOTLAND 455–65 (1998); Sketch of the History of the Court of
Session, 16 J. JURISPRUDENCE (T.T. CLARK) 561, 561 (1872). As discussed in greater detail below, the
High Court of Justiciary exercised supreme judicial authority in criminal matters.
9
See KAMES, supra note 8, at 327–28, 391–395; HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 50
(1760).
10
See infra Part IV. These texts include Historical Law-Tracts, KAMES, supra note 8, Principles of Equity,
KAMES, supra note 9, JOHN ERSKINE, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND (Edinburgh, new ed., James
Badenach Nicholson ed., 1871) (1773), ANDREW MACDOWALL, LORD BANKTON, AN INSTITUTE OF THE
LAWS OF SCOTLAND (1751), and JOHN DALRYMPLE, AN ESSAY TOWARDS A GENERAL HISTORY OF FEUDAL
PROPERTY IN GREAT BRITAIN (Dublin, 4th ed. 1759) (1757).
11
2 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 386 (Charles Edward Dodd & Henry Gwillim
eds., 7th ed. 1832) (1730).
12
See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 37–45, 58–68 (6th ed.
1902).
13
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at **49, 156, 160-61.
14
See ROBIN M. WHITE & IAN D. WILLOCK, THE SCOTTISH LEGAL SYSTEM 26–28 (4th ed. 2007). For most
of the seventeenth century, England and Scotland were ruled by the same monarch but were otherwise
separate countries with separate Parliaments and administrative systems. The Acts of Union of 1707 united
both Parliaments as a new Parliament of Great Britain, which sat in London but legislated for all of the

3

provisions aimed at ensuring the constitutional status of the Court of Session as the
supreme civil court of Scotland.15 Although scholars debate the degree to which one can
regard the Acts of Union as a constitution in American terms,16 it was certainly meant to
provide a lasting framework that would protect the Court of Session (and the hierarchical
Scottish legal system) from parliamentary remodeling.17
In language remarkable for its similarity to Article III of the United States
Constitution, the nineteenth article of the Acts of Union first provided that the Court of
Session would remain “in all time coming” one of two supreme courts of Scotland (along
with the High Court of the Justiciary, the supreme criminal court).18 Second, the Acts of
Union declared that “all Inferior Courts within the said Limits do remain subordinate, as
they are now to the Supream Courts of Justice within the same in all time coming”; the
Acts achieved this in part by forbidding any English court from reviewing the judgments
of the lower courts in Scotland, thereby securing the Court of Session’s place at the top of
a judicial hierarchy.19 Third, the Acts of Union expressly insulated the Court of Session
from any further review by the English courts at Westminster, thus equating that court’s
supremacy with finality.20 Finally, the Acts of Union adopted an early precursor to the
Exceptions and Regulations clause of Article III,21 declaring that the Court of Session
was to remain as “now constituted” by the laws of Scotland, subject to “such regulations
for the better administration of Justice as shall be made by the Parliament of Great
island. Id. For background on the negotiation and adoption of the Treaty and Acts of Union, see generally
J.D. Ford, The Legal Provisions in the Acts of Union, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 106 (2007).
15
See Union with Scotland Act, 1706, 6 Ann., c. 11, art. XIX (Eng.); Union with England Act, 1708, c. 7,
art. XIX (A.S.P.) [collectively hereinafter Acts of Union (1707)]; Ford, supra note 14, at 118–28.
16
Under the American conception of constitutionalism, the written Constitution represents the nation’s
highest law and invalidates any inconsistent enactments by state and federal legislatures. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). By contrast, British courts were understood to possess no such
power of judicial review; the British “constitution” consists merely of the laws that define the institutions
of the British government, as well as certain fundamental laws and guarantees that are important but that
cannot be entrenched against later parliamentary revision. See, e.g., DICEY, supra note 12, at 21–31. The
constitutional status of the Acts of Union in the British system of government has largely escaped the
attention of American scholars. For one notable exception, see John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport,
Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385, 401–02 (2003)
(observing that the Acts of Union could more readily be regarded as having entrenched its norms if viewed
as a treaty binding both England and Scotland than as domestic legislation binding future Parliaments).
17
See, e.g., J.D.B. MITCHELL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 95–96 (2d ed. 1968); Ford, supra note 14, at 128–34;
Denis J. Edwards, The Treaty of Union: More Hints of Constitutionalism, 12 LEGAL STUD. 34 (1992); Neil
MacCormick, Does the United Kingdom Have a Constitution? Reflections on MacCormick v. Lord
Advocate, 29 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 1 (1978).
18
Acts of Union (1707), supra note 15, art. XIX.
19
Id.
20
Id. In an important omission, the Acts of Union did not foreclose review of the judgments of the Session
by the British House of Lords. Historians debate the reason for the omission; some argue that the English
commissioners wished to downplay the issue to avoid a renewal of an English controversy over the Lords’
power to hear appeals from courts of equity. See A.J. Maclean, The 1707 Union: Scots Law in the House
of Lords, 5 J. LEG. HIST. 50 (1984). Others note that the Scots themselves could not agree on whether to
permit House of Lords review. See Ford, supra note 14, at 124. Importantly, historians do agree that a
relatively vibrant practice of seeking parliamentary review had arisen in Scotland in the late seventeenth
century, just prior to the Treaty of Union. See J.D. Ford, Protestations to Parliament for Remeid of Law,
88 SCOTTISH HIST. REV. 57 (2009). In all events, shortly after the Union, the British House of Lords began
accepting appeals from Scotland. See id. at 99–107.
21
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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Britain.”22 Taken together, these provisions specify that although Parliament enjoys the
power to organize and regulate the Scottish court system, its regulations cannot alter the
traditional “authority and privileges” of the Court of Session or undermine its role at the
top of the Scottish judicial hierarchy.23
We think the Acts of Union and Scottish legal architecture deserve a more central
place in the ongoing scholarly debate over the origins and meaning of Article III. For
starters, the Acts of Union provided an important precedent for the creation of entrenched
limitations on the power of the legislative branch to re-model the judiciary. Such
entrenched or constitutional limitations were unknown in England; although the courts
arose through the exercise of royal prerogative, Parliament had long claimed the power to
alter the English central courts by ordinary legislation.24 In England, as a result, judicial
independence under the Act of Settlement was understood to mean independence from
the Crown rather than independence from Parliament.25 Understanding this precedent,
Scottish commissioners secured treaty-based protection against similar re-modeling of
their Court of Session.26 The Acts of Union thus provided the framers with a model for
how to craft fundamental protections for judicial structure and judicial independence.
In addition to establishing a general model of judicial independence from
legislative tinkering, the Scottish experience under the Acts of Union makes clear that an
evidently hierarchical and pyramidal judicial system was available as a model to the
framers of Article III. Not only were lower courts in Scotland bound to comply with the
decisions of the Court of Session, but they were also subject to that court’s ongoing
supervisory oversight and control.27 Even where the Court of Session lacked the power

22

Id.
See 5 WALKER, supra note 8, at 455; Ford, supra note 14, at 119; John W. Cairns, Attitudes to
Codification and the Scottish Science of Legislation, 22 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 27 (2007).
24
Consider, for example, the fate of the prerogative Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission, which
wielded the judicial power of the Privy Council and were abrogated by acts of Parliament in 1640–42. For
an account, see HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT
REFORMATIONS ON WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 309–15 (2006).
25
The Act of Settlement (1701) set the terms of royal succession and specified that the judges of the
English superior courts were to have their salaries “ascertained and established,” and were to serve during
good behavior, subject to removal upon parliamentary address and royal assent. For an overview, see
James E. Pfander, Removing Federal Judges, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1235–36 (2007). This provision
substituted life tenure and parliamentary control of judicial removals for the seventeenth century practice of
subjecting superior court judges to removal at the pleasure of the Crown. See generally Martin Shapiro,
Judicial Independence: The English Experience, 55 N.C. L. REV. 577, 621–23 (1977) (describing
seventeenth-century developments as a change from judicial mastery by the Crown to that by Parliament).
26
The Treaty of Union represented the culmination of a series of negotiations between Scottish and English
commissioners that began shortly after the accession of Scotland’s James V to the English crown (as James
I in 1603) and continued, by fits and starts, through the seventeenth century. See Ford, supra note 14, at
122–23 (evaluating the meaning of the Treaty of Union of 1707 by reference to unsuccessful negotiations
that took place in 1604 and 1670). For an overview, see B.P. LEVACK, THE FORMATION OF THE BRITISH
STATE: ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND THE UNION, 1603–1707 (1987) (highlighting such considerations as
religious turmoil, the English conquest of Scotland during the commonwealth period, the restoration of
Scottish rule, and the question of royal succession that followed the abdication of James II and the Glorious
Revolution).
27
See Countess of Loudon v. Trustees, May 28, 1793, M. 7398, reprinted in DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF
SESSION, NOVEMBER 1792–JULY 1796, at 115, 117–18 (Robert Davidson & David Douglas eds., 1798);
KAMES, supra note 8, at 395. Indeed, the best-known exponent of this conception of the Scottish judiciary,
23
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to review lower court decisions by way of appeal, its supervisory powers allowed the
Court of Session to correct serious errors and to prevent lower courts from exceeding the
boundaries of their own jurisdiction.28 The Scottish judiciary thus exemplified the
hierarchical and pyramidal model of judicial structure that no less a figure than James
Wilson—himself a Scottish native—described as inherent in Article III. An able lawyer,
an active participant in the Philadelphia convention that framed the Constitution, and one
of the first Justices of the Supreme Court, Wilson argued in his 1791–1792 Lectures on
Law that a properly constituted judicial system should resemble a pyramid, with a broad
base of inferior jurisdictions and a single supreme court on top.29 Wilson evidently
believed that the Article III he had helped to craft as a member of the Philadelphia
Committee of Detail met this standard.30
Notwithstanding Wilson’s careful explication, American scholars have doubted
that Article III establishes an inherently hierarchical relationship between the Supreme
Court and any inferior tribunals Congress chooses to establish. Perhaps the most ardent
exponent of such a view, Professor David Engdahl, rejected the claim that Article III
requires Congress to fashion a judicial pyramid and derided any “notion that the
Constitution requires a particular hierarchy—or any judicial hierarchy at all” as “simply
uninformed.”31 Anticipating Engdahl, Professor Wilfred Ritz has questioned whether
Americans, operating without an obvious English hierarchical model to guide them,
would have understood Article III’s provision for a single supreme court as a significant
feature of a hierarchical judicial system.32 More likely, Ritz argues, the framers were
drawing on horizontal judicial models, such as those in England, in which superior courts
exercised primarily a trial rather than an appellate jurisdiction.33 Engdahl argues that
Congress could have implemented Article III by creating separate supreme courts of law,
equity, and admiralty in keeping with the English conception that a judicial system might
have multiple supreme courts of overlapping jurisdiction, dismissing Wilson’s pyramidal
model as chimerical and unprecedented.34

Lord Kames, explained that the power of ongoing supervisory control resulted from the Court of Session’s
supremacy. See KAMES, supra note 8, at 327–28, 429.
28
See infra Part III.
29
2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 149 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). On Wilson’s fascination
with the pyramid, see John Fabian Witt, The Pyramid and the Machine: Founding Visions in the Life of
James Wilson, in PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 47–59 (2007).
30
For an account of Wilson’s many contributions to the Constitution’s framing, see William Ewald, James
Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 901 (2008) [hereinafter Ewald,
Drafting]. See also William Ewald, James Wilson and the Scottish Enlightenment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1051 (2010) [hereinafter Ewald, Scottish Enlightenment] (describing Wilson’s education in Scotland and
his exposure to leading figures in the Scottish enlightenment).
31
David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L.
REV. 75, 157–58.
32
RITZ, supra note 3, at 33, 41.
33
Id. at 35, 44.
34
David E. Engdahl, What’s in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple “Supreme” Courts, 66 IND. L.J.
457, 463, 466–68, 491, 504 (1991). See also Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist Approach to Article III:
Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985) (arguing that Congress could
implement Article III by assigning jurisdiction to lower federal courts and largely depriving the Supreme
Court of appellate jurisdiction). Professor Van Alstyne echoed this view in memorable language:
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Not only does it provide an entirely unchimerical precedent for hierarchy, Scottish
experience under the Acts of Union may have also provided a template on which the
framers relied in choosing words and phrases to secure the role of the Supreme Court of
the United States as the head of the judicial system. Just as Article III vests the judicial
power in one supreme court,35 so too do the Acts of Union guarantee the authority and
privileges of the Court of Session as the “supream” court of Scotland. Just as Article III
allows Congress to ordain, establish, and constitute only courts and tribunals that remain
inferior to the one Supreme Court,36 so too do the Acts of Union specify that inferior
courts must remain “subordinate” to the Scottish supreme court. Just as Article III
contemplates finality,37 so too do the Acts of Union foreclose judicial review of the
decisions of the Court of Session. The close similarity of the concepts and implementing
language suggests that the Acts of Union and the Scottish legal system provided the
framers with a precedent for how to use such concepts as supremacy and inferiority to
structure, and afford constitutional protection to, a hierarchical judicial system.38
Perhaps most provocatively, the Acts of Union and Scottish legal experience may
shed important new light on the ongoing debate over the power of Congress to curtail the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Although the Court derives its jurisdiction, both
original and appellate, from the Constitution, Article III confers appellate jurisdiction
with “such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.”39
Conventional wisdom views this Exceptions and Regulations Clause as a plenary grant of
authority to Congress to curtail virtually any aspect of the Court’s appellate role (subject
to the requirement that Congress not overstep any other external constitutional
limitations).40 Until now, scholars have been unable to chart the origins of the
Exceptions and Regulations Clause, to identify any historical precursors in English law,
or to explain based on the clause’s sparse drafting history why the framers included it or

By reposing finality of such decisions in a number of other courts, [Congress] might thereby give
the Constitution a number of different heads on the order of the mythical Hydra, however peculiar
we might think the result to be in the dimming twilight of federalism.
William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 269 (1973).
35
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
36
Id.
37
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995); Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408
(1792); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 165–67, at 125–
27 (1833). As a formal matter, Article III vests the entire judicial power in federal courts and seemingly
forecloses the assertion of such power by other institutional actors. But the task of defining the essential
features of the judicial power has proven elusive. Compare Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 458 U.S. 50
(1982) (prohibiting non-Article III bankruptcy judges from hearing common law claims), with CFTC v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (permitting administrative agencies to hear such claims). See generally James
E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 643 (2004) [hereinafter Pfander, Article I Tribunals].
38
On the importance of the Scottish political experience to the founding generation, see ALISON L.
LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 24–29, 87–88, 120–124 (2010); David
Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A Missing Transatlantic Context for the Historical Meaning of
“the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms,” 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 119 (2004).
39
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
40
See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1001 (1965); Van
Alstyne, supra note 34.
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how they expected it to operate.41 Without any precursors to provide guidance, adherents
of the orthodox account have simply assumed that the text confers an unqualified
exceptions and regulations power.
In contrast to the orthodox account, a growing chorus of scholars (including one
of us) has argued that Article III’s related requirements of unity, supremacy, and
inferiority impose textual limits on Congress’s court-stripping power by securing the
Supreme Court’s role at the top of the federal judicial hierarchy. 42 On this view, the
Constitution requires Congress to ensure that all inferior courts remain subordinate to the
one Supreme Court specified in Article III. This duty of subordination means that lower
courts must respect the precedents of the Supreme Court and must remain subject to a
degree of supervisory oversight sufficient to ensure lower court compliance with
jurisdictional boundaries and federal law.43 Under what one of us has dubbed the
supervisory account, subordination does not require appellate review in every case; the
Court must simply retain the power to spot check decisions. Congress can fashion
exceptions and regulations to the Court’s as-of-right appellate jurisdiction (in keeping
with the terms of Article III), but it cannot deprive the Court of the discretionary
oversight that inheres in its supremacy.44 In other words, the Article III requirements of
supremacy and inferiority operate as textual limits on Congress’s power to curtail the
Court’s supervisory role.
The Acts of Union provide important support for this revisionist account of the
Exceptions and Regulations Clause. Not only do the two provisions bear an obvious
family resemblance, but the Court of Session was known to have conducted supervisory
review of inferior tribunals in the wake of jurisdictional restrictions, and repeatedly
voiced a conviction that Parliament’s regulations power was circumscribed by the
requirements of supremacy and inferiority in the Acts.45 Drawing on a variety of
41

As Leonard Ratner explained, the “Committee of Detail kept no record of its proceedings, and there is no
evidence apart from the draft itself as to how the language [of the Exceptions and Regulations Clause]
originated.” Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 172 n.69 (1960).
42
For examples, see PFANDER, supra note 7; James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction Stripping and the Supreme
Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433 (2000) [hereinafter, Pfander,
Jurisdiction Stripping]; Pfander, supra note 37; James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court
Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction Stripping, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191 (2007) [hereinafter
Pfander, State Court Inferiority]; Pfander, Article I Tribunals, supra note 37; Steven G. Calabresi & Gary
R. Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist
Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007); Laurence Claus, The One Court that
Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59 (2007). But cf. Amy
Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 360 (2006)
(concluding that neither constitutional text nor structure explicitly create a hierarchical relationship among
federal courts).
43
Pfander, Jurisdiction Stripping, supra note 42; Pfander, State Court Inferiority, supra note 42; PFANDER,
supra note 7.
44
See Pfander, Jurisdiction Stripping, supra note 42; Pfander, State Court Inferiority, supra note 42. On
the distinction between appellate and supervisory jurisdiction, see James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1532–49, 1560–74
(2001).
45
In one well-known case, for example, the Court of Session intervened to overturn an inferior court
decision that was inconsistent with its own earlier determination about the status of a particular public way.
See Countess of Loudon v. Trustees, May 28, 1793, M. 7398, reprinted in DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF
SESSION, supra note 27, at 115, 117–18; see Excluded Jurisdiction, 3 J. JURISPRUDENCE (T.T. CLARK) 14,
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supervisory proceedings that bear some resemblance to the prerogative writs in
England,46 the Scottish Court of Session insisted throughout the eighteenth century that
its power to correct the work of inferior tribunals survived parliamentary restrictions on
its exercise of routine appellate review.47 The Court of Session’s willingness to maintain
its supervisory authority in the face of legislation that curtailed its appellate jurisdiction
illustrates how the constitutional requirements of supremacy and inferiority in Article III
act to confine Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping authority. Although we cannot quantify
Scottish influence precisely, we do know that the Exceptions and Regulations Clause first
appeared in an August 1787 Committee of Detail draft written by the Scottish-born James
Wilson. If, as seems likely, the framers drew on Scottish practice under the clause after
the Acts of Union, then the Court of Session’s eighty years of experience may help to
illuminate the framers’ conception of an exceptions power circumscribed by the
requirements of unity, supremacy, and inferiority in Article III and Article I. Far from an
inexplicable aberration or an unqualified grant of power, we argue, the Exceptions and
Regulations Clause was drawn from a vibrant legal culture, and can be better understood
in light of its historical precedents.
In identifying the influence of Scottish thinking on Article III, this Article
contributes to debates in jurisdictional, legal, and constitutional history.48 First, and of
central importance to our jurisdictional argument, we hope to show that the Acts of
Union and Scottish notions of hierarchy informed the framers’ view that Article III limits
congressional control of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. In doing so, we offer
a historical predicate for the unitary and hierarchical judicial system that has been
missing from debates over federal jurisdiction, and evidence of the origins of the
Exceptions and Regulations Clause that can explain its meaning and context. Second, we
offer a partial solution to the puzzle of how Scottish legal thought left its mark on the law
of the early American republic. Historians have long recognized that Scottish thinking
profoundly influenced the American lawyers of the early republic,49 but have been struck
by the relatively modest Scottish influence on the developing common law of the early
nineteenth century.50 We think that Scottish thought had a greater impact on structural
17 (1859). It did so despite the fact that the British Parliament had adopted legislation conferring final
decision-making authority on the lower court. Id. at 115, 117–18.
46
On the prerogative writ system in England, see generally S.A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, 11
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 40 (1951).
47
See infra Part III.
48
We acknowledge the many contributions of contemporary scholars, on whose work we have drawn in
attempting to understand the influence of Scots thinking on the framing. This Article differs from other
work in focusing on the practice in the Scottish Court of Session, on the specific language of the Acts of
Union, on the way that language operated to constitutionalize the hierarchical structure of the Scottish legal
system, and on the implications of the Scots system for the meaning of Article III.
49
See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978)
[hereinafter WILLS, INVENTING]; GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981)
[hereinafter WILLS, EXPLAINING]; Douglass Adair, “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science”: David
Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, 20 HUNTINGTON LIB. Q. 343 (1957); Arnauld B.
Leavelle, James Wilson and the Relation of the Scottish Metaphysics to American Political Thought, 57
POL. SCI. Q. 394 (1942).
50
See R.H. Helmholz, Scots Law in the New World: Its Place in the Formative Era of American Law, 52
STAIR SOC’Y 169 (2006); C. Paul Rogers III, Scots Law in Post-Revolutionary and Nineteenth-Century
America: The Neglected Jurisprudence, 8 LAW & HIST. REV. 205 (1990); David M. Walker, The Lawyers
of the Scottish Enlightenment and Their Influence on the American Constitution, 1988 JURID. REV. 4.
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matters than on the common law (as to which Blackstone’s account of English law
reigned supreme). Finally, our study of Scottish legal structure may shed some light on
the controversial debate over the place of comparative constitutional law in the
interpretation of the Constitution. We think Scotland, under the Acts of Union, may
provide as useful a source of comparative insight as the English precedents to which
today’s historically minded scholars so frequently turn.51
Our attempt to uncover the Scottish roots of Article III proceeds in five parts.
Part II explores the influence of Scottish thinking on the founding generation. Although
earlier scholars have demonstrated various connections to Scottish legal thought, we
document a wider Scottish influence than has been previously recognized. The writings
of the Scottish jurist and philosopher Lord Kames, in particular, were as widely studied
and accepted by the founding generation as the writings of the English commentators.
Both James Madison and James Wilson were familiar with Scottish legal ideas and with
the writings of Kames; both Madison and Wilson played essential roles in developing
early drafts of Article III and its provision for one supreme Court. Wilson also set forth
the founding era’s most complete early explication of the structure of the federal
judiciary, drawing freely on Scottish legal thinkers as he did so. The widespread
influence of the legal writers of the Scottish Enlightenment suggests that one cannot look
exclusively to Blackstone for insight into the legal culture and political ideology of the
founding generation.52
Part III begins our analysis of the Scottish legal system by comparing it to the
system in England, circa 1770. One immediately notices three differences. First, in
England, a number of superior courts of law, equity, and admiralty competed for business
51

Although many originalists condemn the use of foreign law and constitutions to interpret the U.S.
Constitution, they tend to make an exception for foreign materials that were available in 1787 and familiar
to the framers, such as writings on the common law of England. See, e.g., Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote
Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305, 306 (2004);
John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 307 (2006) (“For originalists,
using foreign or international law from the time a provision was framed can advance our understanding of
the original meaning of the Constitution if it bears on the understanding of those who framed the provision.
In fact, the framers may themselves have used international and foreign law as policy arguments when they
debated the ratification of the Constitution.”).
52
We should say a word about methodology. We have collected a good deal of evidence of Scottish
influence on the generation that framed the Constitution. We think it appropriate, then, in attempting to
recapture the ideas that animated the framers, to concentrate on sources of Scottish law that were widely
available in America and were known to have influenced members of the Philadelphia convention.
Professor Ritz has warned us not to assume that everything we know today was also known to the framers.
As Ritz put it, careful scholarship must demonstrate a nexus between “an eighteenth-century information
source . . . and accessibility to the same information in the United States.” RITZ, supra note 3, at 32. We
hope to meet this standard of demonstrable accessibility by confining ourselves to the materials that were
both familiar to the framers and actively used by them. Our emphasis on Lord Kames’ Historical LawTracts and Principles of Equity and the Acts of Union satisfies both of these criteria; as we shall explain,
Wilson and Madison were both well versed in Kames and Scottish institutions more generally, and Kames’
works circulated widely throughout North America well before and well after the arrival of Blackstone’s
Commentaries. We have not yet found evidence that these men actively consulted Scottish precedents as
they set quill to parchment in the summer of 1787, although they certainly had the opportunity to do so.
But we invite attention to two facts: the important role that the Scottish born James Wilson played in
drafting the judiciary article and the striking similarity between Article III and the Acts of Union, with their
use of supremacy, inferiority and qualified legislative power to secure a hierarchical judicial system. If it
does not quite prove a Scottish connection conclusively, the evidence certainly points to northern Britain.
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and encroached on one another’s jurisdiction.53 England thus lacked any institutional
analogue to the Court of Session, which acted as the only supreme civil court of Scotland
and exercised supervisory review over all inferior courts of any jurisdiction.54 The bestknown works of Scottish legal theorists prominently featured the hierarchical position of
the Court of Session and consistently defined supremacy and inferiority as a function of
one court’s power to supervise and review the judgments of another court. Second,
England treated equity as a separate body of remedies to be administered in a separate
court, the Court of Chancery, whereas Scotland united law and equity in the Court of
Session.55 Third, and most strikingly, English courts owed their existence to royal
prerogative and were subject to the sovereign power of Parliament.56 The Court of
Session, in contrast, enjoyed a measure of constitutional protection from parliamentary
control in the provisions of the Acts of Union that secured its place atop the Scottish
judicial hierarchy.
Parts III and IV then explain the significance of the framers’ knowledge of the
Scottish legal system for the ongoing debate over the meaning of the spare and oftmooted words of Article III. Viewing Article III through an English prism, scholars have
struggled to give meaning to such constructs as unity, supremacy, and inferiority, none of
which fit comfortably with the English model of multiple superior courts of coordinate
jurisdiction. Contrary to those who view the hierarchical structure of Article III as
unprecedented, we think the Scottish court system’s hierarchical judiciary and single
supreme civil court provided a concrete model for the framing of Article III. We present
evidence demonstrating that the framers’ experience with Scottish legal structure directly
or indirectly influenced a number of the central provisions of Article III, including the
Exceptions and Regulations Clause, as well as Article I’s guarantee that any courts
created by Congress must be inferior to the Supreme Court. In addition, we explore ways
in which the Court of Session invoked its supervisory powers to ensure oversight in a
range of cases that appeared to have been, at least nominally, placed beyond the Court’s
purview by legislative action. We think that the Session’s willingness to exercise its
supervisory powers in the face of jurisdictional restrictions provides a notable illustration
of the importance of assured supremacy as a check on the legislative control of a supreme
court’s jurisdiction.
Part V briefly concludes with reflections on the place of English and Scottish
precedents in debates over constitutional meaning. English ideas certainly shaped the
framers’ conception of law and legal institutions. But to an extent not previously
understood in the literature, the Scottish legal system made its own distinctive
contributions to American innovations. Rather than a source that shaped common law
norms, Scottish legal thought appears to have had its most profound impact on the
53

Jurisdictional competition may have been fueled to some extent by the English tradition of fee-paid
judges, whose compensation was dependent on the amount of business they attracted. For accounts, see
James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early Republic, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (2008) [hereinafter Pfander, Judicial Compensation]; Daniel Klerman,
Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (2007).
54
The closest analogy was King’s Bench, which exercised broad supervisory authority over inferior
tribunals through the prerogative writs of mandamus and habeas corpus, among others. We evaluate the
hierarchical aspirations of some English jurists and the somewhat mixed reality below. See infra part III.A.
55
See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 429, 441; KAMES, supra note 9, at 50.
56
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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hierarchical structure of the American federal judicial system and Article III’s provisions
for the protection of the Supreme Court from legislative interference. The Acts of Union
that joined England and Scotland into Great Britain may have played an important role in
the creation of that later, “more perfect union” to which the Constitution’s preamble
aspires.
II. UNDERSTANDING SCOTTISH INFLUENCE DURING THE FOUNDING ERA
Many scholars and jurists today consider it axiomatic that the framers derived
their expectations for the practical operation of the federal judicial department primarily
from the model of the English courts.57 Justice Felix Frankfurter provided a well-known
articulation of this view:
[T]he framers of the Judiciary Article gave merely the outlines of what
were to them the familiar operations of the English judicial system and its
manifestations on this side of the ocean before the Union. Judicial power
could come into play only in matters that were the traditional concern of
the courts at Westminster.58
Raoul Berger echoed Frankfurter’s view thirty years later, capturing the overriding
sentiments of contemporary scholars: “Given a document which employed familiar
English terms—e.g., ‘admiralty,’ ‘bankruptcy,’ ‘trial by jury,’” Berger argued, “it is
hardly to be doubted that the framers contemplated resort to English practice for
elucidation” of Article III.59
Like Frankfurter and Berger, generations of American scholars and jurists have
turned to Blackstone’s Commentaries for insights into the framers’ understanding of the
English legal heritage.60 Blackstone’s importance is understandable. In contrast to the
57

See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of
Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 466 (1994) (highlighting “contemporary English legal
dictionaries and abridgements, treatises, and judicial opinions” as informing the framers’ understanding of
“legal words and concepts of adjudication”); Amanda Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118
YALE L.J. 600, 614 (2009) (describing Blackstone and Coke as the two most influential authors to whom
“the framers turned in shaping American law”). See generally George Jarvis Thompson, The Development
of the Anglo-American Judicial System, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 9, [##] (1932) (tracing the development of the
English legal system and describing the English House of Lords as the precursor to the US Supreme Court).
58
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
59
Berger, supra note 2, at 816. As support, Berger quoted a strongly worded statement from Chief Justice
Taft that bears mention here:
The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the
common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and
adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who submitted it to the
ratification of the Conventions of the thirteen States, were born and brought up in the
atmosphere of the common law and thought and spoke in its vocabulary. They were
familiar with other forms of government, recent and ancient, and indicated in their
discussions earnest study and consideration of many of them, but when they came to put
their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed
them in terms of the common law, confident that they could be shortly and easily
understood.
Id. (quoting Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108–09 (1925)). Notably, Taft’s reference to British
institutions sweeps broadly enough to encompass the Scottish courts of Great Britain.
60
See, e.g., Julian S. Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone’s Commentaries, 27 ILL. L. REV. 629,
631 & n.15, 632–34 (1933); Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV.
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antiquated and abstruse Coke on Littleton,61 Blackstone offered early Americans a
straightforward and easily digestible summary of English law.62 Moreover, the
Commentaries influenced a period of rapid Anglicization of American common law in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.63 Its timely appearance in the United
States in 1770, on the eve of the American Revolution, makes the Commentaries a
natural touchstone for modern efforts to understand English legal institutions at the time
of the framing. Supreme Court opinions, particularly those by originalist-minded
Justices, often treat the Commentaries as a primary source for understanding the framers’
legal milieu.64
Yet the emphasis on English law as depicted in the Commentaries fails to capture
the breadth of ideas and institutions that influenced the framers’ legal thought. The legal
system in British North America during the colonial period did not simply reproduce in
miniature the judicial institutions in England. Colonial legal institutions developed in a
more or less haphazard way over the span of almost two centuries, and often differed in
material respects from the courts at Westminster and from each other.65 Historians have
shown that colonial lawyers had relatively few law books and only the most rudimentary
551, 561 (2006); Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of
Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 731–32 (1976). ). For an account of the colonial appearance of
English editions of the Commentaries in 1770, see HOEFLICH, supra note 1, at 26, 131-34. Blackstone
published the four volumes of the Commentaries between 1765 and 1769, and over one thousand copies
had sold in the colonies by the printing of the first American edition in 1771. Nolan, supra note 60, at 735,
737.
61
Though he later held Coke in great esteem, when Thomas Jefferson was a law student he found Coke
severely frustrating. “I do wish the Devil had old Cooke,” Jefferson wrote, “for I am sure I never was so
tired of an old dull scoundrel in my life.” EDWARD DUMBAULD, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE LAW 11
(1978). Justice Joseph Story described his own encounter with Coke on Littleton thusly: “[A]fter trying it
day after day with very little success, I sat myself down and wept bitterly. My tears dropped upon the
book, and stained its pages.” GEORGE DARGO, LAW IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: PRIVATE LAW AND THE PUBLIC
ESTATE 51 (1983) (quoting ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (1953))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
62
See Waterman, supra note 60, at 632 n.18; Nolan, supra note 60, at 764.
63
See Nolan, supra note 60, at 759–67; G. Edward White, Law in American History: The Colonial Years,
Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 2009-18, Oct. 2009, at
63–64, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1480731; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW: 1780–1860, at 5–6 (1977).
64
For assessments of the influence of Blackstone, see Nolan, supra note 60; Meyler, supra note 60, at 561
(discussing the central importance of Blackstone to Justice Scalia’s method of originalism).
65
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 35 (2d ed. 1985); DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH,
CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC
WORLD, 1664–1830, at 237 (2005); Rogers III, supra note 50, at 234 n.163 (citing G. HASKINS, LAW AND
AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 6 (1960)); Julius Goebel, Jr., King’s Law and Local Custom in
Seventeenth Century New England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416 (1931); Harry W. Jones, The Common Law in
the United States: English Themes and American Variations, in POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL
CONTINUITY 91, 95 (Harry W. Jones, ed., 1976) (“When the people of a particular colony set up simple
legal institutions along the general lines of what they remembered from ‘back home,’ their model was not
necessarily the Court of Common Pleas; it might have been some local tribunal in the English country or
neighborhood from which that group of settlers had come. So law and legal institutions were very different
from colony to colony in the seventeenth century, reflecting differences in historical experience, in soil and
climate and in the religious and social views of the people.”). See also Ross, supra note 5, at 123 (noting
that the English system of administrative oversight tended to respect the internal integrity of each body of
colonial law, instead of attempting to impose a continent-wide uniformity).
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system of legal education.66 Under such conditions, early colonial Americans took the
law where they could find it, often looking to whatever sources were available,67 and
often explicitly rejecting or altering the English legal system where it was found
unsuitable to American conditions or unnecessarily complex and forbidding.68 Even
lawyers of the later colonial period, including such American patriots as Thomas
Jefferson, John Adams, James Wilson, and George Wythe, did not study the law through
Blackstone,69 and had indeed completed their legal studies before the Commentaries
arrived in America.70 Instead, they drew upon a wide and diverse group of writers, which
ranged from Coke and Bacon to Hale and Kames,71 from civil and Roman law writers to
history and political theory.72
Central to legal study in the eighteenth-century were such Roman law authorities
as Cicero and Justinian, and such natural and civil lawyers as Pufendorf, Grotius, Thomas
Wood, and Vattel. When the young lawyer John Adams, for example, presented himself
as a candidate for the bar, one of his interlocutors asked him what he had “lately read” in
Latin.73 The civil law—which formed the basis of admiralty law and the law of nations
66

See CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 157–187 (1911); Charles R. McKirdy, The
Lawyer as Apprentice: Legal Education in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 124,
130–31 (1976); Waterman, supra note 60, at 631 n.14; HOEFLICH, supra note 1, at 33–35 (describing the
scarcity of law books and legal booksellers in colonial America).
67
Roscoe Pound, The Place of Judge Story in the Making of American Law, 48 AM. L. REV. 676, 684–85
(1914) (describing the heavy use of civil law authorities in early American case reports); McKirdy, supra
note 66, at 130 (“A shortage of law books stemming from the high price of importation from England
plagued Massachusetts for most of the Eighteenth Century. For every Jeremy Gridley whose will reveals a
library of almost 700 titles studded with the best English, ancient and continental authorities, there was a
Nathan Tyler who could stuff his entire legal library in his saddlebags.”).
68
See Goebel, Jr., supra note 65, at 417, 420; HERBERT ALAN JOHNSON, JOHN JAY: COLONIAL LAWYER 121
(unpublished dissertation, 1965); ROBERT B. KIRTLAND, GEORGE WYTHE: LAWYER, REVOLUTIONARY,
JUDGE 54 (1986); L. Kinvin Wroth, The Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court and the Federal Admiralty
Jurisdiction, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 250, 253 (1962) (describing the “selective adaptations of English
practices” practiced in colonial New England); Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America:
Controversies over Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 257, 262–63 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
69
See Daniel R. Coquillette, The Legal Education of a Patriot: Josiah Quincy, Jr.’s Law Commonplace
(1763), 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 317, 319 (2007).
70
See, e.g., DUMBAULD, supra note 61, at 10. While studying law, Wilson and Adams had read
Blackstone’s Analysis of the Laws of England (1754), a short work that preceded the work of the Vinerian
lectures and the Commentaries, but they seemed to draw far more on other sources. See James Wilson,
Commonplace Book (unpublished James Wilson Papers, located at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania)
(copies on file with the authors); J.H. Powell, John Adams & Richard Rush, Some Unpublished
Correspondence of John Adams and Richard Rush, Part II, 61 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOG. 26, 39–40 (1937).
Cf. Coquillette, supra note 69, at 334 n.76 (“The first volume of Blackstone’s Commentaries did not appear
until 1765, and there is no mention of it in Quincy’s Law Commonplace. . . . There is a reference to
Blackstone’s more rudimentary Analysis of the Laws of England . . . , but Quincy made little use of it,
apparently preferring Wood’s ‘divisions’ and Hale’s system.” (internal citations omitted)).
71
See Meyler, supra note 60, at 582–84.
72
See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 5–8 (1985); DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: PREVAILING WISDOM (2008).
73
Daniel R. Coquillette, Justinian in Braintree: John Adams, Civilian Learning, and Legal Elitism, 1758–
1775, in LAW IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS 1630–1800, at 359, 363 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds.,
1984). See also id. (recounting Gridley’s emphasis of the civil law, Grotius, and Pufendorf in conversation
with Adams); 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 146 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850) (diary entry, Jan. 24,
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in England and the colonies74—had an enormous impact upon the framers,75 as did
accounts of the Saxon law.76 Despite the focus of today’s scholars on the common law,
one cannot fully understand the framers’ legal studies without examining their interaction
with non-common law sources. In many ways, the framers saw these alternative legal
models as complementary to English common law, rather than as competing, and
incorporated their doctrines into American law whenever the occasion to do so arose.
Scotland provided the framers with a particularly influential collection of ideas
and institutions. For starters, the great thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment were
closely read and studied in North America. In addition, Scots tutors and professors were
central to the education of many of the most important members of the founding
generation. Finally, the patriots who theorized America’s separation from England were
intimately familiar with the way the Acts of Union framed Scotland’s ties with England
and drew freely on earlier forms of governmental structure in thinking through
alternatives to parliamentary supremacy. This part explores the nature and extent of
Scottish influence in some detail and then reassesses Blackstone’s role in the early
republic.
A.

Scottish Influences on the Founding Generation

Numerous scholars have explored the role played by the Scottish Enlightenment
in the thinking of the Founding Fathers. Garry Wills, for example, traces both the
Declaration of Independence and Madison’s writings in The Federalist to Scottish
1765) (describing the study of civil law in Adams’ legal circle). For an account of the extensive influence
of the civil law upon Adams, see generally Coquillette, supra.
74
See Coquillette, supra note 69, at 326; Joanne Mathiasen, Some Problems of Admiralty Jurisdiction in
the 17th Century, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 216 (1958) (describing the continental and civil law origins of
admiralty law). On the origins of English admiralty law, see generally Lionel H. Laing, Historic Origins of
Admiralty Jurisdiction in England, 45 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1946). On the development of admiralty
jurisdictions in the colonies and the early United States, see generally Wroth, supra note 68; William R.
Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117 (1993). On the practice of the early federal courts applying civil law in admiralty
cases, see STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS, AND
THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE [##] (1991).
75
See, e.g., M. H. HOEFLICH, ROMAN AND CIVIL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 51 (1997) (describing the connection between American
scholars and lawyers and civil and continental law); Coquillette, supra note 69, at 322 (explaining that the
eighteenth century legal apprenticeship study often included study of Roman law), 326 (describing use of
the civil law in the education of Josiah Quincy, Jr.); McKirdy, supra note 66, at 129 (describing William
Smith’s suggested legal study program, which began with Wood’s Civil Law, Pufendorf, Grotius, and
Domat’s Civil Law); FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY 52 (1979) (describing
Vattel’s influence on Hamilton); GEORGE C. GROCE, JR., WILLIAM SAMUEL JOHNSON: A MAKER OF THE
CONSTITUTION 27 (1937) (cataloging the extensive collection of civil law books in the library of federal
convention delegate W.S. Johnson).
76
Dating from the period before the Conquest in 1066, Saxon law was thought to offer an authentic source
of common law ideas and exerted a powerful influence on such patriots as Thomas Jefferson, John Adams,
and James Wilson. See, e.g., David Thomas Konig, Legal Fictions and the Rule(s) of Law: The
Jeffersonian Critique of Common Law Adjudication, in THE MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA 97, 114
(Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann eds., 2001); Gilbert Chinard, Introduction to THE
COMMONPLACE BOOK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: A REPERTORY OF HIS IDEAS ON GOVERNMENT 57 (Gilbert
Chinard ed., 1926); 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 29, at 337–38, 347–52, 408.
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intellectual origins.77 Douglass Adair similarly attributes Madison’s Federalist No. 10 to
the influence of the Scot David Hume.78 Several writers have noted James Wilson’s use
of Scottish “Common Sense” philosophy in developing his theories of natural law,
popular sovereignty, and political institutions.79 Although Gordon Wood has rightly
cautioned against attempting to isolate a single influence from the array of ideas in play
at the time,80 no one doubts that Scottish Enlightenment philosophers and social scientists
had earned a prominent place in the thinking of framing-era Americans.81
Part of that influence stems from an influx of Scottish immigrants and royal
officials during the eighteenth century and the proliferation of Scottish teachers in
colonial American universities, primary schools, and private homes. According to
Professor Adair, the works of the major figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, such as
David Hume, Adam Smith, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, Lord Kames, and Adam
Ferguson, “had become the standard textbooks of the colleges of the late colonial
period.”82 At Princeton, the Scottish parson John Witherspoon, university President and
later a delegate to the federal Constitutional Convention, steeped his students, including
James Madison, in both Scottish social science and Whig politics.83 At William and
Mary another Scottish immigrant, Dr. William Small, exerted a similar influence upon
the education of Thomas Jefferson.84 As noted, James Wilson was born in Scotland and
educated at St. Andrew’s University before emigrating to America.85 Although Wilson's
biographers have provided conflicting accounts of Wilson's education in Scotland,86 new
77

WILLS, INVENTING, supra note 49; WILLS, EXPLAINING, supra note 49.
Adair, supra note 49.
79
See, e.g., Leavelle, supra note 49; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation: John Marshall, James
Wilson, and the Problem of Reconciling Popular Sovereignty and Natural Law Jurisprudence in the New
Federal Republic, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113, 117 (2003); Stephen A. Conrad, James Wilson’s
“Assimilation of the Common-Law Mind,” 84 NW. U. L. REV. 186, 206 (1989).
80
See Gordon S. Wood, Heroics, 28 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 2, 1981.
81
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Bailyn, England’s Cultural Provinces: Scotland and America, 11 WM. & MARY Q. 200 (1954).
82
Adair, supra note 49, at 345. See id.; Rogers III, supra note 50, at 221 n.5.
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RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 45 (1971) (describing the large number of Scottish
books Witherspoon brought to Princeton); WILLS, EXPLAINING, supra note 49, at 18.
84
See DUMBAULD, supra note 61, at 3–4.
85
Farrand describes Wilson’s role at the convention as “[s]econd only to Madison and almost on a par with
him.” MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 197 (1913). For a critique of Farrand’s view
and an argument that Wilson’s contribution should be considered as distinct from and in many respects
stronger than Madison’s, see generally William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution,
10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 901 (2008)Ewald, Drafting, supra note 30.
86
In the past, Wilson’s biographers have disputed whether he also studied at Glasgow and Edinburgh. See
GEOFFREY SEED, JAMES WILSON 3–4 (1978). Had he done so, he would have numbered some major
Enlightenment figures his teachers. See Walker, supra note 50, at 12–13 (speculating that Wilson may
have been taught by John Millar or attended Adam Smith’s lectures on jurisprudence, and may have even
encountered Kames and Hume). Cf. The Hon. Lord Mackenzie-Stuart, Benjamin Franklin in Scotland, 6
DENNING L.J. 119, 124 (1991) (conjecturing that Wilson may have met Benjamin Franklin at St. Andrew’s
in 1759). Despite their disagreement, it has always been acknowledged that Wilson became acquainted
with the philosophy of his countrymen. See Ewald, Drafting, supra note 30, at 902–03. After finishing his
law apprenticeship to John Dickinson in Philadelphia, Wilson moved to Carlisle, Pennsylvania, a
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research from Professor Martin Clagett seems to establish that Wilson also attended the
University of Glasgow, where he likely attended lectures given by Thomas Reid, Adam
Smith and John Millar, and where he apprenticed at law for three years.87 Andrew
Hamilton, attorney to John Peter Zenger in the famous Zenger Trial of 1735, was also a
Scottish-educated immigrant.88 Hamilton and Wilson were in fact but two among many
Scotsmen occupying important positions in the political life of the colonies.89 And
Jefferson, Madison, John Marshall, and Alexander Hamilton all were tutored largely at
the hands of Scots from their earliest years.90
In addition, during the colonial era many wealthy colonial families sent their
children abroad to study law and medicine.91 Some students went to England—to study
law as John Dickinson did at the Middle Temple, for example—but a surprising number
went to Scotland to study at the universities at Edinburgh and Glasgow.92 In particular,
many young men from the area of Virginia that was home to Jefferson, Madison,
Marshall, George Washington, George Mason, and Patrick Henry were educated at
Scottish universities.93 The Virginian Cyrus Griffin, for example, a judge on the Federal
Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, President of the final Continental Congress from
1788–89, and a United States District Judge, studied law at the University of
Edinburgh.94 Benjamin Rush, who signed the Declaration of Independence and was a
member of the Pennsylvania constitutional ratifying convention, studied medicine there.95

community flush with Scottish immigrants, to begin his law practice. SEED, supra, at 5; id. at 192 n.13.
See also CHARLES PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742–1798, at 205 (1956) (describing
Wilson’s involvement in the Scottish St. Andrew’s Society in Philadelphia).
87
Ewald, Scottish Enlightenment, supra note 30, at 62. We are in Professor Clagett’s debt for sharing with
us his discoveries, which he will publish in a forthcoming book.
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See BURTON ALVA KONKLE, THE LIFE OF ANDREW HAMILTON, 1676–1741, at 5–8; Richard B. Morris,
The Legal Profession in America, in POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY, supra note 65, at
[##].
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See LACROIX, supra note 38, at 122 (“[T]hroughout the eighteenth century a corps of Scots and ScotsIrish officials had been involved in imperial administration, both at home and in Great Britain and in North
America. . . . This class of imperial middlemen brought with them a special appreciation for the many
varieties of union, as well as a confederal vocabulary that was crucial for American federal thought.”).
90
See Rogers III, supra note 50, at 221 n.7; WILLS, EXPLAINING, supra note 49, at 63; id. at 66 (noting that
King’s College relied heavily upon Scottish social science and philosophy, and that Hamilton’s tutor there
had attended the University of Glasgow); DUMBAULD, supra note 61, at 3–4 (describing Jefferson’s early
education under William Douglas and James Maury); 1 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL 53, 57 (1916). The son of Marshall’s Scottish tutor Archibald Campbell was “among the most
distinguished lawyers of Virginia.” Id. at 57.
91
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 65, at 97.
92
See Walker, supra note 50, at 11 (describing Benjamin Franklin’s role in sending American students to
study in Scotland); 1 BEVERIDGE, supra note 90, at 24. With their growing commitment to free inquiry,
Scottish universities were thought to offer a better education than the more hidebound and scholastic
universities at Oxford and Cambridge. See Ewald, Scottish Enlightenment, supra note 30, at 1080–81.
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See 1 BEVERIDGE, supra note 90, at 32.
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See HENRY BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS’
COMMITTEES ON APPEAL AND ITS COURT OF APPEALS IN CASES OF CAPTURE, 1775–1787, at 84 (1977); 7
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 618–19. Griffin was forced to leave Scotland after eloping with
the daughter of a Scottish earl, and completed his legal education in England. Cyrus Griffin,
http://cyrusgriffin.com/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
95
Rogers III, supra note 50, at 221 n.5.
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Despite its acknowledged influence upon the framers’ philosophical and political
thinking, Scotland’s contributions to the legal systems of early America have attracted
little scholarly attention.96 Yet Scottish Enlightenment figures—many of whom were
lawyers and jurists—were concerned to a large degree with public law, private law, and
government.97 Adam Smith and David Hume, for example, both wrote on the law: Smith
delivered an important series of lectures on jurisprudence,98 and Hume’s A Treatise on
Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Nature treated natural law
and theories of justice extensively.99 To be sure, Scottish private law never took hold in
the United States during the nineteenth century in the way that Blackstone and the
English common law did.100 Nevertheless, Scottish legal writers had a significant impact
upon the generation of men that wrote and ratified the Constitution.
To begin with, the large influx of Scottish immigrants, commerce with the mother
isle, and a linguistic kinship nurtured connections between American and Scottish law
throughout the colonial period. When James Alexander immigrated to New York from
Scotland in 1715, for instance, he brought with him the largest law library in the
colony.101 Alexander, who went on to become a prominent attorney and teacher to a
number of New York’s lawyers, made the library available to lawyers throughout the
colony. Many of the important lawyers, judges, and government officials in the colony
were frequent borrowers from Alexander’s library, which included several books on
Scottish law and government.102
The Scotsman Sir John Dalrymple’s An Essay Towards a General History of
Feudal Property (“Feudal Property”),103 a history of the development of the feudal
96

See Rogers III, supra note 50, at 205; but see Walker, supra note 50, at 25 (“[I]t is a reasonable inference
from the evidence that the thinking and teachings and writings of some of the jurists and philosophers of
the Scottish Enlightenment were among the influences on the minds of the draftsmen of the Constitution
and of those who by their comments helped to settle that document.”).
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See, e.g., Hon. Madame Justice Bertha Wilson, The Scottish Enlightenment: The Third Shumiatcher
Lecture in “The Law as Literature,” 51 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 251, 253 (1987); Adair, supra note 49, at
345; Walker, supra note 50, at 4; Mackenzie-Stuart, supra note 85, at 119.
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Walker, supra note 50, at 14.
99
See KNUD HAAKONSSEN, THE SCIENCE OF A LEGISLATOR: THE NATURAL JURISPRUDENCE OF DAVID
HUME AND ADAM SMITH (1981).
100
See Rogers III, supra note 50. A variety of factors may have contributed to the comparative absence of
Scottish influence on American common law. For one thing, in keeping with its civil law origins, the Court
of Session tended to issue simple rulings as opposed to reasoned explications of law of the kind that formed
the backbone of the common law system of precedent. Law was more a matter of reasoning from first
principles than applying a body of prior judicial opinions. See John W. Cairns, Scottish Law, Scottish
Lawyers, and the Status of the Union, in A UNION FOR EMPIRE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE BRITISH
UNION OF 1707, at 261–62 (John Robertson ed., 1995). For another, Scots law itself tended to borrow
English precedents in the wake of the Acts of Union, influenced both by the review of Session decisions in
the House of Lords and by the ready availability of English decisional law. Id. at 248–50. English
common law thus tended to capture both Scottish and American private law.
101
PAUL M. HAMLIN, LEGAL EDUCATION IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 76 (1939).
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Id. at 77. In 1730, for example, Alexander purchased from Governor Montgomerie’s estate Acts of
Parliament in Scotland, Stair’s Institutes, Sir Thomas Craig’s De Feudis, Scots Acts of Parliament, “Craig
of Homage,” and Old Laws and Constitutions of Scotland. At the same sale, John Miln purchased “Acts
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Parliament in Scotland.” Id. at 194, app. VII. A Scottish bookseller sold the first subscribed edition of
Blackstone in 1770. See HOEFLICH, supra note 1, at 131–34.
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DALRYMPLE, supra note 10.
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system in Great Britain and the legal systems of Scotland and England, was on the
bookshelves of many prominent lawyers and libraries in America.104 Thomas Jefferson,
for example, made extensive excerpts from Feudal Property in his commonplace book,105
and later included it in his recommended course of law studies for his cousin.106 John
Adams and his friends in the Sodality Club, a society formed by Adams, James Otis, and
Jeremy Gridley to study the law, also read and discussed the work, and James Wilson
began his Legal Commonplace Book (compiled under the tutelage of John Dickinson, a
Philadelphia lawyer and federal convention member) with an excerpt from a chapter in
Feudal Property entitled “Jurisdiction,”107 which provides a sketch of the development of
the Court of Session.108
104

See, e.g., 2 E. MILLICENT SOWERBY, CATALOGUE OF THE LIBRARY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 317 (1953);
CATALOGUE OF BOOKS SOLD BY GARRAT NOEL, & CO. 9 (1759); A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS SOLD BY NOEL
AND HAZARD 12 (Noel & Hazard, 1771); A CATALOGUE OF A VERY LARGE ASSORTMENT OF THE MOST
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Walker, supra note 50, at 23; THE COMMONPLACE BOOK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 76, §§
569–584, at 135–162. A commonplace book was a journal kept by law students that kept a record of
excerpts from, and comments upon, the books that the student read. See Coquillette, supra note 69.
Jefferson made excerpts from Dalrymple’s account of the Scottish court system in Feudal Property. See
THE COMMONPLACE BOOK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 76, § 584, at 160–62.
106
WILLIAM HAMILTON BRYSON, LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA, 1779–1979: A BIOGRAPHICAL
APPROACH 25–26 (1982) [hereinafter BRYSON, LEGAL EDUCATION] (citing Letter of Thomas Jefferson to
John Garland Jefferson, June 11, 1790, reprinted in 16 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 480–82 (J.P. Boyd
ed., 1961)). See also Chinard, Introduction, supra note 76, at 19 (“In [Dalrymple], Jefferson was able to
find historically established the same principles as in Kames, with a much more precise and emphatic
condemnation of the system of entails and primogeniture.”). Indeed, Jefferson’s library contained an
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Practicks of the Laws of Scotland (1706), William Forbes’s Journal of the Sessions (circa 1714), Thomas
Craig’s Jus Feudale (1732 ed.), and Judgments of the Lords of Session (1768). See 2 SOWERBY, supra note
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See EDWIN WOLF 2ND & KEVIN J. HAYES, THE LIBRARY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN # 3024, at 708 (2006)
(Scotland, Laws and Statutes (1704)); Library of John Adams, http://www.johnadamslibrary.org/ (The
Laws and Acts of Parliament Made by King James the First, Second, Third, Fourth Fifth, Queen Mary,
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BIBLIOTECAE LOGANIANAE 20 (Loganian Library 1760) (Burgh Laws of Scotland); DAVID HALL,
IMPORTED IN THE LAST VESSELS FROM EUROPE (1763) (Robertson’s and Buchanan’s History of Scotland);
Books in Williamsburg, supra note 104, at 102, 106 (Robertson’s and Buchanan’s History of Scotland);
SAMUEL CAMPBELL, SALE CATALOGUE FOR 1787, #542, at 20 (1787) (Maclaurin’s Arguments and
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Later, in his law lectures, Wilson made extensive use of Scottish works, such as
those by Thomas Reid and Adam Smith,109 and the writings on civil government and
public law by John Millar.110 Wilson’s lectures also refer to Lord Bankton’s Institutes of
the Law of Scotland.111 Institutes was one among a long series of “institutional” works
on the Scottish law. These are general treatises, ranging from Viscount Stair’s byzantine
seventeenth-century tome, which was available and read in the colonies,112 to the later,
more streamlined works by Bankton, William Forbes, and John Erskine. The
institutional works resemble (and generally precede) Blackstone’s Commentaries,113 but
were not prominent in America in the eighteenth century.114 Erskine’s work, however,
gained more influence in the nineteenth century; Story and Kent both cite him
extensively, which led to modest use of his work as authority in American courts.115
Foremost among the Scottish legal writers read in America was Lord Kames, a
leading figure in the Enlightenment and one of the most famous judges ever to sit on the
Court of Session.116 Kames’ interests ranged widely, from agriculture to philosophy to
zoology, but one of his chief areas of study was the law. Through a series of works on
Scottish and English law, primarily Historical Law-Tracts,117 Principles of Equity,118 and
Essays upon . . . British Antiquities (“British Antiquities”),119 Kames melded legal
doctrine with history, political science, and metaphysics in an attempt to provide a
scientific explication of the law as it was and as he conceived it should be.120
Kames was well regarded in England, and his works were familiar to and admired
by England’s major legal figures.121 Blackstone’s Commentaries, for example, cite to
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Walker, supra note 50, at 23–24.
111
Bankton, supra note 9; see 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 29, at 505, 853. Wilson cites
the work as M’Douall, referring to Bankton’s given name Andrew McDouall.
112
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STUD. 318 (1984).
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Historical Law-Tracts and discuss Principles of Equity.122 Lord Mansfield, the Scottishborn Chief Justice of King’s Bench, read widely in Kames and other Scottish legal
writers, and attempted to emulate Scotland’s merger of law and equity by importing
equitable principles into his common law decisions.123 And Jeremy Bentham, echoing
the sentiments of many of the Founding Fathers, “viewed Kames’s writings as a ‘vital
corrective to Blackstone.’”124
Although Kames has been largely forgotten by American legal scholars today, his
works were prevalent in revolutionary America125 and exerted a profound influence
during the period surrounding the formation of the American republic.126 In the era
before Blackstone’s Commentaries and Story’s Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence,
122

See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *49 (citing KAMES, supra note 8, at 325, 330); id. at **49, 430,
433, 441 (contesting Kames’ arguments in Principles of Equity). See also Julian S. Waterman, Mansfield
and Blackstone’s Commentaries, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 549, 561 (1934) (“[Blackstone] did not believe, as did
Lord Kames whose statements he was refuting, that it was the business of a court of equity to abate the
rigor and harshness of the common law nor did he believe that the common law courts were characterized
by harsh and illiberal principles.”). Cf. W.S. Holdsworth, Blackstone’s Treatment of Equity, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1929) (critiquing Blackstone’s understanding of equity).
123
Waterman, supra note 122, at 559; id. at 562–63, 566–67; ROSS, supra note 116, at 237–42.
124
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THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 145
(1989)).
125
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framing. See, e.g., 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 73, at 146–47 (noting discussions in the
private legal club Sodalitas of Historical Law-Tracts and British Antiquities in 1765); HERBERT A.
JOHNSON, IMPORTED EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LAW TREATISES IN AMERICAN LIBRARIES: 1700–1799, at 34–
35 (1978) (listing Historical Law-Tracts and British Antiquities in the libraries of Adams, Jefferson, and St.
George Tucker, and Principles of Equity in the libraries of Jefferson and Jasper Yeates); BRYSON, CENSUS,
supra note 106, #59, at 8 (Kames’ Remarkable Decisions of the Court of Session); id. ##430, 431, at 59
(Historical Law-Tracts and Principles of Equity); Massachusetts Historical Society, Inventory of Books
Received by Thomas Jefferson from the Estate of George Wythe, circa 1806,
http://www.masshist.org/database/imgviewer.php?item_id=1768&img_step=1&nmask=24&tpc=&mode=large&tpc=#page1 (last visited Feb. 23,
2010) (listing Principles of Equity among George Wythe’s legal books); A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS 21
(Garrat Noel, 1762) (Historical Law-Tracts); A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS SOLD BY RIVINGTON AND BROWN
#732, at 64 (James Rivington, 1762) (Historical Law-Tracts); DAVID HALL, IMPORTED IN THE LAST
VESSELS FROM EUROPE, supra note 106 (Historical Law-Tracts); THE CHARTER OF LAWS, AND CATALOGUE
OF BOOKS, OF THE LIBRARY COMPANY OF PHILADELPHIA (Library Company of Philadelphia, 1764)
(Principles of Equity); A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS SOLD BY NOEL AND HAZARD, supra note 104, at 12
(Historical Law-Tracts); ROBERT BELL, SALE CATALOGUE OF A COLLECTION OF NEW AND OLD BOOKS
#272, at 14 (1773) (Historical Law-Tracts); SAMUEL CAMPBELL, SALE CATALOGUE FOR 1787, supra note
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many American lawyers and students turned to Kames’ works, and seemed to view them
not as an interesting specimen of foreign law, but as a part of the law as received from the
mother country.
During his trips to Scotland in 1759 and 1771, Benjamin Franklin became
acquainted with most of the major figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, and forged a
personal friendship with Lord Kames. Indeed, Franklin stayed at Kames’ estate, and the
two maintained a long correspondence.127 As a result of this friendship, Franklin, a
delegate to the Federal Convention, brought Historical Law-Tracts and Principles of
Equity with him when he returned to America in 1760.128 In a letter to Kames, Franklin
wrote:
I am now reading with great pleasure and improvement your excellent
work, The Principles of Equity. It will be of the greatest advantage to the
judges in our colonies, not only in those which have Courts of Chancery,
but also in those which, having no such courts, are obliged to mix equity
with the common law. It will be of more service to the colony judges, as
few of them have been bred to the law. I have sent a book to a particular
friend, one of the Judges of the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania.129
Kames’ influence in America widened throughout the 1760s. Wilson, Madison,
Jefferson, and Adams all referred to Kames in their writings on law and government, and
all engaged deeply with the Scottish jurist during their legal studies. In a diary entry
from 1765, for example, John Adams referred to Kames in a manner suggesting that he
and his colleagues in the Sodality Club had studied his writings extensively. Of
particular note is Adams’ recollection of his statement to the group that “Kames has
given us the introduction of the feudal law into Scotland.” In the course of that
discussion, Adams recalled, “I quoted to my brothers the preface to the Historical Law
Tracts,” and later, that he “might have quoted Lord Kames’s British Antiquities” on the
oppressiveness of the theory underlying the British feudal system.130 Adams’ A
Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law also quotes British Antiquities approvingly.131
As a law student under George Wythe (judge on the Chancery Court of Virginia
and a member of the Federal Convention), Jefferson devoted a considerable portion of his
Legal Commonplace Book to Kames’ discussion in Historical Law Tracts of criminal
law, property, promises and covenants, securities, inheritance, and courts, and almost half
of his Equity Commonplace to gleanings from Principles of Equity.132
127

Mackenzie-Stuart, supra note 85, at 123–28. In fact, Franklin’s appellation “Dr. Franklin” came from
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Kames’ influence persisted even after the arrival of Blackstone’s Commentaries,
the first American edition of which was published in 1771.133 In a series of letters and
papers, Jefferson advised young lawyers to study Kames in their preparation for the law,
recommending both his philosophical works and Principles of Equity, Historical LawTracts, and British Antiquities.134 Another reading list, prescribed by Judge Parker of
New Hampshire for Ezra Stiles, Jr. in 1778, included “Kames’ History of Law”
(Historical Law-Tracts) and Stair’s Institutions of the Law of Scotland.135 As a practicing
attorney in 1784, Alexander Hamilton wrote a brief in the case of Rutgers v. Waddington
that cited almost exclusively to Principles of Equity.136 And when John Marshall, who
briefly attended George Wythe’s law lectures before completing his legal studies
alone,137 was establishing his law practice, the first three law books that he purchased
were Blackstone’s Commentaries, Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws, and Principles of
Equity.138 Still later, Justice Joseph Story made extensive use of Principles in a number
of his commentaries.139
Most importantly, Kames’ legal writings were well known to and used by
Madison and Wilson, the two central architects of the Constitution. Following his
education at Princeton under Witherspoon, James Madison referred to the works of
Kames in his correspondence “with that easy familiarity that assumes writer and reader
have a thorough knowledge of the author[] mentioned.”140 Two years after he began
studying the law, Madison cited Kames’ Principles of Equity alongside Francis Bacon as
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guiding authority in a discussion of how to structure the judicial system of Kentucky.141
Similarly, Wilson read Kames as a legal apprentice and returned to his works throughout
his life.142 In his law lectures, Wilson cites extensively to Kames, including to Historical
Law-Tracts and Principles of Equity,143 and seems to have modeled the plan of his
lessons—which blended law, history, and philosophy—after the former work in both
inspiration and subject matter.144 At the end of his opening lecture, in fact, Wilson stated
that his instruction was intended to follow in large part the principles of law laid down by
three men: Bacon, Bolingbroke, and Kames.145
B.

Reassessing Blackstone’s Influence

Blackstone’s omission from Wilson’s triad deserves special attention. Even
though Americans of the founding generation eagerly purchased and read Blackstone,
they registered their suspicion of his writings on public law and his effusive praise of the
English government and legal system. In part this was a manifestation of the newly
independent American nation’s complex attitude towards England and English-derived
common law.146 Wilson’s suspicion reflected a commonly held view that Blackstone’s
vision of sovereignty and parliamentary supremacy was unsuited in many material
respects to the creation of a republican system of government.147
This suspicion is clearly visible in Wilson’s lectures. According to Wilson, “the
principles of our constitutions and governments and laws are materially better than the
principles of the constitution and government and laws of England.”148 To prove his
point, Wilson launched into an extensive refutation of Blackstone’s ideas on popular
sovereignty, concluding, “I cannot consider him as a zealous friend of republicanism.”149
Although Blackstone provided a fine survey of the common law,150 his writings on public
law and government were built upon “unsound and dangerous principles,”151 and were
141
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primarily valuable only as “materials of contrast.”152 Blackstone, Wilson wrote,
“deserves to be much admired; but he ought not to be implicitly followed.”153 Wilson
therefore criticized both Blackstone’s writings and the English constitution’s judicial
system, and defended the institution of judicial review from Blackstone’s notions of
parliamentary supremacy.154 John Adams also preferred other legal writers to Blackstone
and—echoing Wilson—stated, “We should be grateful to Blackstone, without adoring
him.”155
Blackstone’s most implacable enemy on this side of the Atlantic, however, was
Thomas Jefferson, who distrusted Blackstone throughout his life and later came to
despise him with an almost devotional furor.156 In a series of letters, Jefferson lamented
the influence of Blackstone, whose “honied Mansfieldism” Jefferson thought had made
Tories of the members of the American legal profession. To limit Blackstone’s reach,
Jefferson frequently attempted to exclude the Commentaries (with the exception of St.
George Tucker’s republicanized version) from schools and courts.157 In part, Jefferson’s
animosity was motivated by a feeling that the Commentaries were “nothing more than an
elegant digest of . . . the real fountains of the law,” such as Coke.158 But in greater part,
as he expressed in an 1826 letter to James Madison, Jefferson feared that republican
principles had been supplanted in legal education by Blackstone’s more conservative
views, a development that endangered the liberty of the new republic.159
With their shared distrust of Blackstone’s prescriptions on questions of judicial
review, legislative supremacy, and constitutionalism, Wilson, Adams, and Jefferson gave
voice to a fundamental revolutionary American mindset that arose from a long-running
colonial struggle to articulate limits on the power of Parliament.160 Indeed, just as
Blackstone was describing a view of parliamentary supremacy that was rapidly gaining
152
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orthodox status in the imperially-minded England of the 1760s,161 Americans were
turning to a different model more suited to their notions of autonomy: that of the Scottish
government between the union of the crowns in 1603 and the union of the Parliaments in
1707. In 1603, James VI of Scotland inherited the English throne from Elizabeth I and
became King James I of England. But although Scotland and England then shared a
common monarch, their governments and national identities remained separate, for “each
nation retained its own parliament and thus its legislative supremacy.”162 With the
exception of enforced conquest during Oliver Cromwell’s protectorate,163 full
incorporation between England and Scotland did not occur until the Parliaments of the
two nations negotiated and implemented the Treaty of Union—through legislation known
as the Acts of Union—in 1707, which reformed the separate legislative institutions as one
Parliament of the new nation of Great Britain.164
In an important recent book, Professor Alison LaCroix has argued that the
Scottish model formed one of the conceptual foundations of both early notions of
colonial independence and the federal system of divided sovereignty and authority across
different levels and branches of government.165 A vision of the “halcyon century” of
Scottish legislative independence loomed large in revolutionary America, and indeed
Wilson, Jefferson, and Adams made that precedent central to their insistence that,
notwithstanding the allegiance owed to the Crown, their colonial legislative bodies were
independent and not subject to parliamentary control.166 For Wilson, Adams, Jefferson,
and others, the question of Parliament’s power over the colonies was fundamentally
about the possibility of divided sovereignty in a state, and two centuries of discussion
over the relationship between Scotland and England before and after the Acts of Union
formed the predicate for an alternative model to Blackstone’s assertions of legislative
supremacy. The Scottish model helped the framers to see that supremacy and
sovereignty, far from being monolithic, might be divided between the federal and state
governments and between legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.167
With this more complete background, we can better appreciate the influence of
Blackstone and the Westminster model on the Constitution. The misgivings of Adams,
Jefferson and Wilson confirm that Blackstone was not met with universal acceptance
among the Founding generation, particularly on such subjects as sovereignty and
parliamentary supremacy. Indeed, Dennis Nolan concludes that Blackstone had little
direct impact upon the formation of the Constitution. According to Nolan’s careful study
of Blackstone’s influence, the members of the federal convention used the Commentaries
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less as a structural model or template, and more as a law dictionary.168 Nolan observes,
however, that because Blackstone was so widely read in the early republic and in the
nineteenth century, his work had an “indirect and delayed” influence upon the lawyers
and judges who were to interpret the Constitution.169 “If we read the Constitution today
as if it were written by Blackstone,” Nolan explains, “it is only because the Constitution
has been interpreted by generations of judges trained on the Commentaries.”170
In fact, it was not until well after the adoption of the Constitution, in part through
the efforts of Joseph Story and James Kent to create a uniform American private law
jurisprudence modeled after the English common law,171 that Blackstone attained his
mythical status as expounder of the law as the framers understood it.172 Because of the
need for a stable and well-developed body of legal principles, American private law in
the nineteenth century ultimately embraced and followed—with some modifications—the
path laid down by the English common law.173 Thus, when it came to the basic principles
of property or contract law, Blackstone’s codification of the English common law
claimed a dominant position in Americans’ understandings, which in turn fueled the
assumption that Blackstone was equally important at the time of the Framing. But as we
have seen, the framers felt free to depart from English structures; they not only distrusted
the English, but they also shared the heady notion that they were crafting a government
that would assimilate and improve upon the wisdom of the ages.
In other words, although private law continued down the common law path, the
framers crafted a public law system that diverged materially from the model of the
English constitution.174 The American Revolution and the ensuing developments that led
to the adoption of the Constitution caused a significant break with the home country’s
conception of public law and government institutions. Daniel Hulsebosch has captured
the spirit of careful and judicious selection that animated the Framing:
All participants alternated between embracing and recoiling from
conventional
wisdom,
defining
precedents
and
proposing
innovations. . . . Noah Webster, the Federalist lawyer who later compiled
the first American dictionary, warned that Americans should not receive
indiscriminately the maxims of government, the manners and the literary
taste of Europe and make them the ground on which to build our systems
in America. Yet just as he did not abandon the English language, he did
not jettison English law. There was a mixture of profound wisdom and
168
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consummate folly in the British constitution; a ridiculous compound of
freedom and tyranny in their laws.175
While drafting the Constitution, the framers thus attempted to create a uniquely American
system of government, one that borrowed from the English model but also improved
upon it in important respects by looking to reason, experience, history, and legal and
political theory.176 One can see this selective borrowing, refinement, and rejection nicely
illustrated in the many ways in which the constitution of the federal courts in Article III
departed from the English model.177
At the time of the ratification, many commentators recognized the extent to which
the Constitution’s provision for federal courts differed from their English predecessors.
The Anti-Federalist Brutus argued that in many respects, including the fusion of law and
equity in the Supreme Court and provisions for judicial independence that dispensed with
legislative review of judgments, the proposed federal courts “departed from almost
every . . . principle of [English] jurisprudence.”178 In England, Brutus wrote, the courts
were “on a very different footing.”179 Similarly, in attacking the proposal to lodge the
power to decide cases in both law and equity in the Supreme Court, the Federal Farmer
objected that “in the constitution of this supreme court, as left by the constitution, I do not
see . . . a shadow of our own or the British common law.”180
An illustration from St. George Tucker’s influential republican edition of
Commentaries nicely captures the gap between Blackstone and the conception of judicial
power that found its way into the Constitution. Writing in response to Blackstone’s
assertion that the sovereign power lies in Parliament, the body that makes the laws, and
that all other parts of the government “must conform to and be directed by it, whatever
appearance the outward form and administration of justice may put on,” Tucker argued
that the Constitution stood as the expressed will of the sovereign people. Because the
legislature was but one branch of that will, it could not alter the design of the judiciary
outside the bounds created by the document.181 According to Blackstone, it was “at any
175
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time in the option of the legislature to alter [the] form and administration [of justice] by a
new edict or rule, and to put the execution of the laws into whatever hands it pleases.”182
According to Tucker, however, in the Constitution:
[T]he sovereignty of the people, and the responsibility of their servants are
principles fundamentally, and unequivocally, established; in which the
powers of the several branches of government are defined, and the excess
of them, as well in the legislature, as in the other branches, finds limits,
which cannot be transgressed without offending against that greater power
from whom all authority, among us, is derived; to wit, the PEOPLE.183
Tucker’s argument suggests that the notion that a Supreme Court such as the one created
by the Constitution could be understood only by reference to Blackstone is deeply
flawed: for Blackstone, no court was truly supreme because every court was simply the
outward manifestation of the supreme will of a sovereign Parliament. But for Tucker, the
federal courts were an independent department of government with an institutional share
of the sovereignty vested by the people. Blackstone cannot provide the sole reference for
those seeking to interpret the constitutional relationship between Congress and the federal
courts because his account of public law was rejected in large part by the framers.
We do not mean to disparage Blackstone’s importance or to downplay the
influence of English institutions upon the American Constitution. Rather, we simply
observe that forming a complete picture of the framers’ legal universe requires
consideration of a wide variety of materials. Many voices contributed to the framers’
understanding of the law, and to focus exclusively on one may undercut our ability to
understand the origins of the American judicial system. Perhaps, then, next to Justice
Frankfurter’s statement one should place Thomas Jefferson’s statement that the
Commentaries,
although the most elegant and best digested of our law catalogue, has been
perverted more than all others, to the degeneracy of legal science. A
student finds there a smattering of everything, and his indolence easily
persuades him that if he understands that book, he is master of the whole
body of law.184
The framers, unlike many of the young lawyers Jefferson meant to criticize, were not the
legal offspring of Blackstone: many of them learned the law before his work came to
America and, though they found his Commentaries edifying, they often ventured to
disagree with him.
III. ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND ARTICLE III
If Blackstone and Westminster did not stand alone as sources of the framers’
knowledge of law and legal institutions, and if Scottish institutions also brooked large in
their thinking, then there may be some profit in exploring how the Scottish model
informed the framing of the federal judiciary. In this part, we first sketch the institutional
features of the English court system as a baseline for comparison. We next describe the
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Scottish legal system as depicted in the widely read Kames treatise, Historical LawTracts. Then, we consider several ways in which prominent features of Scotland’s
judicial system, as secured by the Acts of Union, were duplicated in the framing of
Article III.
A. The English Legal System: A Brief Overview
Although some English jurists of the eighteenth century aspired to hierarchy, and
frequently spoke of King’s Bench as the supreme court of the common law, England did
not establish a hierarchical court system until much later.185 In eighteenth-century
England, the judicial power was divided among multiple superior courts of overlapping
and coordinate jurisdiction.186 There were three superior courts of common law, King’s
Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, each with jurisdiction over claims throughout the
realm. Meanwhile, the Court of Chancery handled cases in equity, the ecclesiastical
courts managed family and probate law, and the High Court of Admiralty addressed
matters that arose on salty water.187 These coordinate courts exercised overlapping
authority and competed with one another to expand their jurisdiction at the expense of the
other courts.188 Thus, King’s Bench expanded its common law authority through the writ
of trespass to poach on Common Pleas and Exchequer adopted the fiction that all debts
are debts to the Crown to expand its authority over private litigation.189
King’s Bench exercised a measure of supervisory oversight, but did not act as
the supreme court of England with final authority over all judicial disputes. King’s
Bench clearly did have the power to oversee inferior tribunals; parties could seek the
removal of criminal proceedings into King’s Bench through a writ of certiorari.190 Writs
of mandamus and habeas corpus would oblige inferior jurisdictions to explain their
185
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inaction or their decision to imprison and writs of prohibition would compel lower courts
to refrain from hearing matters outside their bailiwicks.191 Nevertheless, the power of
King’s Bench to hear appeals and to supervise was somewhat haphazardly distributed:
King’s Bench could hear appeals from Common Pleas but not from Chancery or
Exchequer. It could issue writs of prohibition to the ecclesiastical courts and to
Admiralty (along with habeas corpus to test a petitioner’s entitlement to personal liberty),
but it could not issue writs of prohibition to Chancery.192 The judicial separation that
flowed from the absence of any oversight produced a conceptual separation as well;
Blackstone and the English viewed common law and equity as distinct bodies of law193
and Chancery as the only forum in which any equitable defenses or points of law might
be raised.194
Two other institutions played judicial roles in England and helped to further
complicate the picture. First, the Court of Exchequer Chamber, which began not as a
fixed court but simply as a college made up of all the judges of the superior courts at
Westminster, exercised some degree of oversight.195 Occasionally, divisive legal
questions in Chancery or in one of the other superior courts would be adjourned into
Exchequer Chamber for collective deliberation and solemn resolution. English jurists
viewed such decisions as the highest source of legal authority in the realm, and as
providing a rule to govern the judicial disposition of the dispute by the court in
question.196 Such dispositions, however, were subject to the possibility of appeal to a
second quasi-appellate judicial institution, the House of Lords. Exercising a portion of
judicial power that remained as a vestige of the days when the High Court of Parliament
would sit curia regis to hear petitions on a range of issues, in the eighteenth century the
House of Lords would review matters by writ of error, but its forms were legislative and
it was not constituted as a judicial tribunal until the 1830s.197 In addition, the House of
Lords enjoyed no general supervisory authority such as that wielded by King’s Bench
and the other superior courts.198 Finally, although the decisions of the House of Lords
controlled the resolution of the dispute on appeal, they were based on a vote of all the
Lords (legally trained and otherwise) and thus enjoyed little precedential weight among
the superior courts.199
Colonial Americans came into contact with English judicial forms in one more
way: by prosecuting appeals from their own courts to the Privy Council in London. With
the demise of Star Chamber in the seventeenth century, the Privy Council lost its judicial
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role in matters domestic to England.200 Nevertheless, it retained judicial authority in
cases coming from the colonies, assessing local decisions and colonial legislation to
determine if they were repugnant to British law.201 Privy Council review entailed an
element of hierarchy; it proceeded on the assumption that the Council had the final word
on the matter under review and that the colonial courts were duty-bound to carry its
decrees into effect. Professor Mary Sarah Bilder has described repugnancy review by the
Privy Council as an important precursor to the eventual development of the institution of
judicial review in the United States.202
From an American vantage point, then, perhaps as many as three different
institutions could claim to act as the supreme court of England. King’s Bench played that
role with respect to many features of domestic litigation, exercising a supervisory power
over lower courts that Blackstone described as high and transcendent.203 Yet the
decisions of King’s Bench, at least outside the supervisory context, were subject to
further review in the Court of Exchequer Chamber or in the House of Lords, an
institution that was sometimes characterized as the highest court in the realm.204 As for
matters that originated in the colonies themselves, Privy Council served as the court of
final jurisdiction (though it proposed to apply the law of the colonies themselves, rather
than some uniform body of continental or imperial law)205. No court, however, sat alone
at the top of the heap.
B. The Scottish Legal System Through the Eyes of the Framers
A very different model existed to the north of Newcastle. In Historical LawTracts, a work that has gone unremarked by latter-day students of the federal judiciary in
the United States, Lord Kames provided a comprehensive view of the Scottish court
system and of the jurisdiction of the Court of Session, Scotland’s one supreme civil court.
The Court of Session stood at the zenith of the judicial system as the only supreme court
of civil jurisdiction (a closely related High Court of the Justiciary served as the supreme
court in criminal matters).206 In addition to a robust original jurisdiction over suits for
200
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damages, the Court of Session reviewed decisions from inferior courts. Significantly, all
inferior courts of civil jurisdiction were subject to its review, including both the common
law sheriff and baronial courts and the admiralty and ecclesiastical courts.
As for the mode of review, the Court of Session initially relied on the appeal,207 a
proceeding familiar to civil law countries, which Scotland to an extent was.208 By
Kames’ time, however, the court had come to conduct review primarily through the
home-grown supervisory processes of advocation, suspension, and reduction.209 As
Kames described them, these three extraordinary processes served a function similar to
that of the prerogative writ system in England. Kames equated advocation with the writ
of certiorari: when the Court of Session issued an advocation, it called up to itself a case
from an inferior court and then proceeded to try the case or review the decision of the
lower court.210 Suspension and reduction worked somewhat like the writ of prohibition: a
reduction set aside the decree of a lower court, while an accompanying suspension
prohibited the lower court from executing a judgment during the period of review.211
Another feature of the Court of Session provides an important distinction with the
English model. Unlike the system in England, which viewed law and equity as separate
remedies to be administered in separate courts, the Court of Session had the power to
administer both remedies in a single case.212 Scotland thus had no Court of Chancery to
jostle with the common law courts for jurisdiction. According to Kames, the Session
inherited the power to decide cases in equity by virtue of its supremacy: upon assuming
the position of the Scottish Privy Council, the Court of Session used its extraordinary
powers—called its nobile officium—to fashion new remedies where necessary to achieve
justice.213 Because all roads led to the Court of Session as the supreme civil court, that
court necessarily required the ability to administer justice in whatever outward form a
case took on.
Two courts acted outside the supervisory purview of the Court of Session. First,
the High Court of Justiciary served as the supreme and final court in criminal cases.214
Second, the Court of Exchequer, which was established after the union with England in
1707, used English law and was reviewable only by the English Court of Chancery and
the House of Lords of Great Britain in order to facilitate uniform decisions on revenue
cases throughout the kingdom.215 An exchequer court of the English variety was
unknown to Scotland before the Acts of Union, and was viewed with suspicion in
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Scotland as a foreign institution.216 The House of Lords also heard appeals from the
Court of Session from 1708, another English imposition after the Acts of Union. Prior to
the union, litigants possessed only a limited ability to protest to the Scottish King and
Parliament for a remedy of a decision of the Session, an avenue of review which had only
been instituted in 1689, and which many maintained was confined to inquiring into
excess of jurisdiction or judicial corruption.217 In addition, many observers questioned
the extent to which the Acts contemplated appellate review by the British House of
Lords, and even after such review was assumed, the decisions of the House of Lords
remained unpublished and without binding precedential value in Scottish courts.218
The Scottish court system thus provides an eighteenth-century model of a
hierarchical judiciary that closely resembled the perfect judicial pyramid described by
James Wilson in his lectures. Multiple inferior courts spread throughout the kingdom
conducted much of the judicial business in civil cases in the first instance. These courts
were in turn regulated by either the Court of Session or, in admiralty actions, the
intermediate High Court of Admiralty and then the Court of Session. In addition, even
where separate remedies or types of action were administered in separate inferior courts,
supervisory review of all such civil causes merged in the Court of Session. As we shall
explain, many of the important features of the Court of Session and the Scottish judicial
system were replicated in the United States Constitution. The next section of this part
explores in more detail the way the structure of the federal judiciary in Article III came to
resemble the Scottish model.
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C. Constitutional Status for the Federal Courts
The framers readily agreed that the Constitution should include provisions for an
independent judiciary. That familiar decision, now enshrined in Article III’s declaration
that the judicial power was to be vested in one supreme and perhaps several inferior
federal courts, represented an important departure from the English model. In England,
the courts enjoyed no special constitutional status. They had arisen through the exercise
of royal prerogative, growing up over time and enjoying a customary jurisdiction that
ebbed and flowed with the jurisdictional pretensions of their various judges and the
oversight of the Crown.219 In the early seventeenth century, the Courts of King’s Bench
and Chancery conducted their well-known feud over the boundaries between law and
equity; eventually, King James I intervened to umpire the relative authority of the two
tribunals.220 Although the English courts rose in stature and gained a measure of
independence from the Crown during the course of that eventful century, they remained
subject to broad parliamentary oversight and control, including review by the House of
Lords. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, when Montesquieu wrote his famous discourse on
the separation of powers, he treated the judiciary as an agency of the executive power,
rather than as an independent branch or power of government.221 More immediately for
the framers, prior to the Revolution the colonial courts had been merely functionaries of
the royal will: the Crown used the prerogative to create the colonial courts, appointed and
removed colonial judges at will and subjected their decisions to review in the Privy
Council.222
In Scotland, by contrast, the judicial system enjoyed a measure of constitutional
protection, dating from the Acts of Union in 1707, that guaranteed the courts a degree of
departmental independence both from the Crown and from Parliament. As we have
explained, England and Scotland had been united through allegiance to a common
monarch since 1603, but had remained separate nations with independent Parliaments and
governments. After the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, England
and Scotland appointed commissioners to negotiate terms for a merger of the two
nations.223 These terms evolved into a Treaty of Union and were memorialized by the
219

[cite]. As an example, see the description of the incessant creation, abolition, and remodeling of the
English admiralty courts by the Tudor kings and their predecessors in R.G. Marsden, Early Prize
Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England, 24 ENG. HIST. REV. 675 (1909).
220
For an account of the face-off between Coke and Bacon, see John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere
Disinterred: The Attack on Chancery in 1616, 36 Ill. L. Rev. 127 (1941).
221
See M. DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 1 SPIRIT OF LAWS, book 11, ch. 6 (treating the judicial
power as one of the two elements of the executive power); see generally M.C.J. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 28–30 (1967) (describing Montesquieu’s treatment of the judicial and
executive powers). Montesquieu primarily understood the judicial power as being exercised by the jury.
Cf. Jack Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061, 1063–64 (2007)
(describing Montesquieu as longer on theory than on descriptive accuracy).
222
Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 282–84 (2009); LaCroix,
supra note 201, at 451, 467–70 (2010). On the nature of colonial courts and the demand for independent
judiciaries following statehood, see [cite].
223
For an account of the “management’ of the Scots Parliament by representatives of the Crown urging
ratification of the Union, see Karin Bowie, Publicity, Parties, and Patronage: Parliamentary Management
and the Ratification of the Anglo-Scottish Union, in THE UNION OF 1707: NEW DIMENSIONS 78, 91–92

35

English and Scottish Parliaments in what scholars know today as the Acts (or Act) of
Union of 1707. Most of the articles of the Acts of Union, which dissolved the two
previous parliaments and created a new Parliament of Great Britain,224 addressed such
matters as commerce, trade, and guarantees for the Scottish aristocracy.225 But in
addition to these provisions, the Acts of Union included an article devoted entirely to the
preservation of the hierarchical structure of the Scottish court system. Article XIX—
which has, like many of the other materials considered in this Article, yet to enter the
canon of federal jurisdiction scholarship in the United States—secured the position of the
Scottish courts, particularly the Court of Session, from English interference. (The Scots
understood that they were to be a minority in the newly formed Parliament of Great
Britain.)
The terms of Article XIX aimed to confer constitutional status on the Court of
Session, making it in some measure immune from the otherwise unchecked power of
Parliament.226 Remarkably, as we explore in more detail below, many of the article’s
specific provisions and concepts appear to have informed the drafting of Article III. But
perhaps the most important idea expressed in the Acts of Union was that of using
structural guarantees to secure the judicial system from Parliament’s oversight and
control. The judicial article of the Acts of Union begins by declaring that the Court of
Session will “remain in all time coming within Scotland, as it is now constituted by the
Laws of that Kingdom, and with the same Authority and Privileges as before the Union,
subject nevertheless to such Regulations for the better Administration of Justice, as shall
(Stewart Brown & Christopher A. Whatley eds., 2008) (describing the use of public arguments and such
private incentives as secret payments and promises of post-union offices to secure majority support in the
Scottish Parliament for implementation of the union). As Professor Whatley has noted, however, many
Scots saw the union as providing political and financial benefits to Scotland, and the portrayal of the
negotiations as the outcome of an “uneven contest between an all-conquering England on the one side and a
defenceless Scotland, united in opposition, on the other is less persuasive now than it may have been
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be made by the Parliament of Great Britain.”227 The phrasing is significant: the assurance
that the Court of Session was to remain as presently “constituted” in “all time coming”
was evidently meant to ensure against parliamentary remodeling.228 In other words, the
Acts of Union attempted to insulate the Scottish court system from the threat that
ordinary legislation could pose to its independence, structure, or jurisdiction.
In a second important feature, the Acts of Union specify and qualify legislative
power over the Scottish court system. The Acts reject the tradition of royal control that
characterized the English court system and colonial courts; it deposits the power to make
regulations and alterations for the better administration of justice in the “Parliament of
Great Britain,” subject however to a number of qualifications. In the Constitution,
Article III (and Article I) followed this approach, depositing the power to ordain and
establish lower federal courts (and the power to constitute inferior tribunals) in the
Congress of the United States and thus implicitly disavowing any role for the President in
the creation or reshaping of the judicial system beyond the appointment power.229
Significantly, although the framers looked to some of the reforms introduced by
Parliament in England to secure the independence of judges (such as life tenure), they
ultimately chose to reject both the despised colonial system and the English model of
complete parliamentary control. Instead, they adopted the system prefigured by the Acts
of Union of legislative organization subject to constitutional safeguards, a system
designed to ensure the independence of the judicial department.230
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Third, the Acts of Union anticipate Article III in conferring only a qualified power
on Parliament to reshape the Court of Session. Although Parliament could “regulat[e]”
the Court of Session to improve its administration, it was given no power to make any
“alterations” in its power and authority. That omission appears quite significant in view
of the fact that Article XIX elsewhere recognizes the power of Parliament to make
“regulations” of and “alterations” to the jurisdiction of other Scottish courts, including
the High Court of Admiralty. In addition, Article XIX explicitly required that all inferior
courts in Scotland “remain subordinate as they are now to the supream courts [of Session
and Justiciary] for all time coming,” thus ensuring that Parliament’s regulations would
not disturb the Session’s supremacy over subordinate inferior courts.
Seemingly, then, Article XIX anticipates the Exceptions and Regulations Clause
of Article III and its provision for qualified legislative control of the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction. Just as Article XIX allows housekeeping rules for the better
administration of justice, and omits any authority to make more far-reaching alterations
to the Court of Session, so too does Article III confer a qualified power on Congress to
fashion exceptions to and regulations of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. All
of the evidence suggests that this exception and regulations power was meant to authorize
Congress to make federal justice more convenient by allowing lower courts to exercise
final authority in many cases of modest significance.231 The Necessary and Proper Clause
confirms this conclusion, limiting Congress to legislation aimed at carrying the judicial
power into execution and thus obliging Congress to act for the better administration of
justice.232 Notably, as the next section emphasizes, nothing in Article III authorizes
Congress to countermand the requirement that the Court remain supreme in relation to
inferior tribunals.

IV. HIERARCHY, INFERIORITY, AND THE SUPERVISORY POWER
A. Unity, Hierarchy, and Article III
1.

One Supreme Court

In addition to building a constitutional foundation for an independent judicial
system, the framers chose to create a hierarchical judiciary with “one supreme court” at
law, and statecraft (and much else besides) could be found on the Library Company's
shelves, as well as numerous tracts and polemical writings by American as well as
European authors. And virtually all of those works that were influential in framing the
minds of the framers of the nation are still on the Library Company's shelves.
EDWIN WOLF, AT THE INSTANCE OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LIBRARY COMPANY OF
PHILADELPHIA
(1976).
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http://www.johnadamslibrary.org/book/?book=2221577Adams%2093.1%20v.9%20Folio (listing Statutes
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the top of the heap. The decision was taken in the course of early deliberations on the
terms of the Virginia plan, which had provided that a “National Judiciary be established
to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals.”233 This resolution
teed up the question whether to adopt the English model of multiple superior courts of
overlapping and duplicative jurisdiction or to adopt the Scottish-style model of a
pyramidal system. On June 4, 1787, the convention answered that question in favor of
the unitary model, opting for the vesting of judicial power in a single supreme court and
such inferior courts and tribunals as Congress might establish or constitute.234
In the past, one of us has argued that the framers of Article III made a deliberate
decision to create a hierarchical judicial system, with one Supreme Court at the top of
that system and such inferior courts and tribunals as Congress might choose to constitute,
ordain, and establish down below. In particular:
The inferiority requirement of Article[s] I [and III] operates as a limit on the
power of Congress and of the tribunals to which Congress assigns federal
jurisdiction: such tribunals must remain subordinate to the Supreme Court as the
head of the judicial department of the federal government. This requirement of
subordination to the Supreme Court may oblige inferior tribunals to give effect to
the Court's precedents and submit to some form of supervisory oversight and
control. While Congress may regulate the Court's appellate jurisdiction [under
the Exceptions and Regulations Clause], it may not place inferior tribunals
beyond the Court's supervisory authority as the Supreme Court of the United
States. . . . Article I specifically states that any tribunals must remain inferior “to”
the Supreme Court--a formulation that suggests subordination as the likely
meaning of the provision.235
On such a view, which is sometimes called the supervisory account, inferior
federal courts have wide authority to decide cases finally without being subject to as-ofright review, but must remain subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, which maintains its supremacy not through direct review in every case, but
through discretionary intervention when necessary. Other scholars have expressed
sympathy for this conception of the significance of a unitary and pyramidal judicial
system.236
The English model of overlapping and coordinate superior courts was well known
to the framers, and led to familiar problems. Two consequences flowed from the absence
of a single judicial head. First, courts of overlapping jurisdiction competed for business
with one another, indulging fictions to expand their jurisdiction.237 King’s Bench, for
example, adopted the fiction that all claims amounted to a trespass, whereas the Court of
Exchequer treated all debts as owing to the Crown.238 Second, judges would contend
over which tribunal’s judgment was decisive of a dispute that touched the jurisdiction of
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two or more courts. As a result, King’s Bench and Chancery often heard the same
dispute and often disagreed as to which court’s judgment should take precedence.239 The
dispute between Lord Coke and his adversaries Lords Bacon and Ellesmere illustrated the
unfortunate consequences of festering jurisdictional conflicts.240 We believe that, in
choosing to avoid the nettlesome problems arising from the English-style dispersal of
jurisdictions, the framers made a significant decision to emphasize uniformity through
final review in a single court of last resort, a decision that creates a framework within
which to interpret Article III.
Despite the well-known difficulties with the English system, however, some
scholars have argued that Article III contemplates the creation of a national judiciary that,
as under the Westminster model, could have included multiple superior courts with final
review over a large amount of federal judicial business. Professor David Engdahl,
relying upon the system of coordinate superior courts used in England and many of the
states, has contended that inferior courts were simply those whose geographic or subject
matter jurisdiction was more limited than that of supreme or superior courts.241
According to Professor Engdahl, when James Wilson stated in his law lectures that a
proper judiciary should resemble a pyramid, he was not describing judicial systems of the
day, but was instead advocating for fundamental change.242 Consequently, for Engdahl
the hierarchical federal judicial department we know today emerged by historical
accident rather than from the plan of the Convention.243 Congress would have been free,
on this view, to implement Article III with a system of multiple supreme courts.
Professor Ritz provides important support for Engdahl’s position, contending that none of
the court systems with which the framers were familiar featured a hierarchical judicial
structure with a single supreme court that exercised predominantly appellate
jurisdiction.244 At the center of these arguments lies the notion that the framers simply
had no hierarchical model upon which to draw in fashioning the judiciary, and therefore
had little—if any—expectation for a hierarchical federal judicial system. A such, the
arguments go, the choice of a single supreme court was a relatively trivial one with few
implications for our understanding of Article III.
In contrast to the English model emphasized by Engdahl and Ritz, however, the
Scottish judiciary featured all of the elements of hierarchy that one finds in Article III.
The Scottish Court of Session was known as the “supream” (as an adjective rather than as
a title) civil court of Scotland,245 and was so described in Historical Law-Tracts,
Principles of Equity, and in the Acts of Union. As we shall explore below, the
supremacy of the Court of Session consisted of three features: its power to supervise the
work of inferior courts, its own freedom from oversight or supervision, and its power to
decide all civil causes regardless of whether the cause arose in law, equity, or admiralty.
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Indeed, important structural provisions in Article XIX of the Acts of Union were
designed to safeguard the traditional hierarchy of the Scottish judiciary, preserving
supervisory review by the Court of Session and protecting the Session itself from
supervision. To be sure, the British House of Lords assumed the power to conduct writ
of error review of the Court of Session from 1708 onwards. But whatever the bona fides
of the practice of appellate oversight by the House of Lords, the treaty had expressly
ruled out a much more intrusive form of judicial review. Article XIX expressly prohibits
the courts at Westminster from reviewing any judgment of the Court of Session or other
Scottish court: “[N]o Causes in Scotland [shall] be cognoscible by the Courts of
Chancery, Queens-Bench, Common-Pleas, or any other Court in Westminster-hall; and
that the said Courts, or any other of the like Nature, after the Union, shall have no Power
to cognosce, review, or alter the Acts or Sentences of the Judicatures within Scotland, or
stop the Execution of the same.”
This limitation accomplishes two things: First, it confirms the linkage between the
supremacy of the Court of Session and its finality, preventing English courts from
subordinating the Session by subjecting it to any form of review. Second, the provision
equates supremacy with hierarchy; by prohibiting interference by the Westminster
superior courts with any inferior jurisdiction in Scotland, the Acts of Union forestalled
parliamentary or judicial circumvention of the Session’s supervisory role and ensured
that the Session’s supremacy with respect to the Scottish inferior civil courts would
remain intact. Combined with its guarantee that all inferior courts within the realm
would remain “subordinate to the supream court[]” of Session, the Acts of Union gave
voice to an understanding of the importance of unity, finality, supremacy, and inferiority
to the workings of a hierarchical judicial system, concepts that ultimately found
expression in Article III.
2. The Joinder of Law, Equity and Admiralty
For example, the Scottish background likely informed an important but heretofore
inscrutable episode from the Federal Convention: the combination of jurisdiction over
cases in law and equity in the Supreme Court, a combination that implemented—at least
as a practical matter—unity as a defining feature of the federal judicial system. In
contrast to the English model of divided jurisdictions, Article III ultimately extended the
judicial power of the United States to “all Cases, in law and equity,” and to “all Cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”246 The former phrase arose out of a proposal by
William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut, regarded by his contemporaries as one of the
foremost authorities on law among the framers.247 Madison’s notes describe the episode
as follows: “Docr. Johnson suggested that the judicial power ought to extend to equity as
well as law—and moved to insert the words ‘both in law and equity’ after the words
‘U.S.’ in the 1st line of sect. I.”248 One delegate, George Read of Delaware, “objected to
vesting these powers in the same Court,” but the motion passed with the approval of both
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the Virginia (Madison) and Pennsylvania (Wilson) delegations.249 The Convention
records provide no further information about why the phrase was proposed or why the
delegates voted in favor of it. Moreover, the structural choice has received little scholarly
attention, perhaps in part because, like the switch to a unitary supreme court, it seemed to
have no analogue in the Westminster model.250
Yet our evidence demonstrates that the framers were deeply familiar with a
Scottish court that blended law and equity, as well as with a lengthy debate across the
Atlantic regarding the merits of a unitary court system. This debate centered to a large
degree on the reasoning of Lord Kames. In the Introduction to his widely read Principles
of Equity, Kames made an extensive case for the unitary model of his own court.251
Kames recognized that courts should be careful to remember in which mode they were
proceeding and not to let the rules of equity and law become too intertwined. But he
argued that the Scottish system was superior because it avoided both the complexity of
multiple proceedings and the unjust results often dictated in English courts by their
inability to administer certain forms of relief and to entertain certain claims and
defenses.252
Although Kames’s argument met with mixed praise in England,253 it found a more
receptive audience in an America that saw no reason to duplicate the complexity (or
expense) of the courts of Westminster.254 In 1785, while giving his advice on how to
structure the constitution of the aborning state of Kentucky, James Madison expressly
referred to Principles of Equity:
With regard to a Court of Chancery as distinct from a Court of Law, the
reasons of Lord Bacon on the affirmative side outweigh in my Judgment
those of Lord Kaims on the other side. Yet I should think it best to leave
this important question to be decided by future lights without tying the
hands of the Legislature one way or the other. I consider our county
249
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courts as on a bad footing and would never myself consent to copy them
into another constitution.255
Although Madison himself came down on the side of separate courts, he recognized that
others might disagree and proposed to leave the choice between Bacon and Kames to the
legislature.
In his Law Lectures, James Wilson also joined the debate between Bacon and
Kames:
Should the jurisdiction according to equity, and the jurisdiction according
to law, be committed to the same court? or should they be divided between
different courts?
My Lord Bacon thinks that they should be divided: my Lord Kaims thinks
that they should be united. All this is very natural. My Lord Bacon
presided in a divided, my Lord Kaims was a judge in a united jurisdiction.
Let us attend to their arguments: the arguments of such consummate
masters will suggest abundant matter of instruction, even if we cannot
subscribe to them implicitly.256
In the end, Wilson sided with Kames. After paraphrasing the two positions, and
analyzing their respective merits, Wilson concluded that, because the distinction between
law and equity in England arose out of obscure historical circumstances unsuited to
convenience, “every court of law ought also to be a court of equity.”257
The evidence thus suggests that well-informed participants in the framing of
Article III were quite familiar with the debate between Bacon and Kames and may have
interpreted Dr. Johnson’s motion as adopting the Scottish model—just as Wilson
discussed the debate in explaining and defending the decision subsequently.258 (Read’s
objection to vesting the powers of law and equity in the same court certainly calls to mind
the Bacon position.) Johnson’s motion carried by a vote of six states to two, which
included Madison and Wilson in the affirmative,259 and accomplished two things. First, it
extended the judicial power of the Supreme Court to cases in law and equity, thereby
assuring that Court of a supervisory role with respect to any lower federal court. Second,
it created the possibility (doubtless agreeable to Madison) that Congress could create
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separate lower courts of law and equity if it chose to do so. As proposed by Johnson, the
judicial power in law and equity was to be vested in the Supreme Court and in “such”
inferior courts as Congress might establish, thereby conferring a measure of discretion on
the legislative branch as to give the lower federal courts a more specialized
jurisdiction.260
The entire episode nicely illustrates the idea that (somewhat in contrast to Justice
Frankfurter’s implication) the framers were not simply copying the judicial system of
England and the colonial state courts. Despite the fact that they dated from the colonial
times and tracked in many respects, as Engdahl notes,261 the Westminster system,
Madison made quite clear that he did not regard the Virginia courts as worthy of
emulation. Wilson considered both the English and the Scottish systems as potential
guides but refused to “subscribe to them implicitly.” Both men attempted, as they had
done with the executive and legislative branches, to use all of the models and materials at
hand to craft a judicial branch that improved upon the system they inherited from
England.262
Indeed, in two important respects Article III departs from Scottish ideas by
extending unity and finality to their logical conclusions. First, despite the Acts of
Union’s insulation of Scottish courts from supervisory review at Westminster, Parliament
interposed itself as an appellate body to overturn decisions of the Court of Session.
Article III, by contrast, vests the entire judicial power in the federal courts, dispensing
with any form of legislative appellate review.263 In doing so, the framers established a
judicial power that was truly independent of the executive and legislative powers and also
created a court that was truly supreme because it was entirely immune from political
supervision or correction. Second, although Scotland lacked overlapping superior courts,
it did divide its judicial power into two separate hierarchies under the supreme Court of
Session in civil causes and the supreme High Court of Justiciary in criminal ones. The
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framers took the notion of unity one step further, vesting all of the judicial power in one
Supreme Court in both civil and criminal cases. These two departures lend force to
Wilson’s description of the work of the framers in looking to exterior models for
inspiration but making independent decisions in order to improve upon those models. At
the very least, however, the framers’ familiarity with Scotland’s supreme court and with
what Wilson called its “united jurisdiction” suggests that the shift from multiple supreme
courts to one was far from meaningless. Instead, it was a fundamental choice between
division and coordination as represented by the English model on the one hand and unity
and hierarchy as represented by the Scottish model on the other.
B.

Supremacy, Inferiority, and the Exceptions and Regulations Clause

Most importantly, the Scottish model and the writings of Lord Kames call into
question the validity of the orthodox view of the Exceptions and Regulations Clause of
Article III. Under the well-known terms of the orthodox view, Congress has broad power
over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction and can fashion exceptions and regulations that
would eliminate the Court’s power to hear certain categories of cases.264 Orthodoxy
further holds that Congress can effectively zone unpopular constitutional rights out of the
federal courts altogether by combining its power to restrict the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts under the Madisonian compromise with its power to fashion exceptions to
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.265 Although a number of scholars have questioned
orthodox claims of plenary congressional power, the challenge for critics of orthodoxy
has been to identify a textual limit on what appear to be the unqualified terms of Article
III’s exceptions and regulations clause. For example, the so-called essential function test
put forward by Professors Hart and Ratner—which argues that Congress must not
exercise its power to make exceptions in a way that removes the Court’s essential role in
the federal system266—has been faulted for its indeterminacy and its lack of textual
foundation.267
A growing body of literature, however, suggests that Article III’s requirements of
unity, supremacy, and inferiority provide an important textual limit on congressional
jurisdiction-stripping power. One of us has argued that the Exceptions and Regulations
Clause must be read in connection with the constitutional requirements that other
tribunals remain inferior to the one supreme Court in the Constitution.268 To the extent
that the Court’s supremacy entails a supervisory role, it ensures ongoing forms of
supervisory intervention on a basis independent of any particular grant of appellate
jurisdiction. Moreover, because the Constitution impresses the status of inferiority on
any tribunal constituted to hear federal cases, it ensures that both state and lower federal
court decisions will remain subject to review in the wake of restrictions on the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction. On this view, Congress has broad power to fashion exceptions to
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the Court’s as-of-right appellate jurisdiction, but lacks the power to assign matters to the
state courts and free them from supreme judicial oversight and from the obligation to
apply the Court’s own precedents as to the meaning of federal law.
Yet the inferior-as-subordinate position, which lies at the center of a hierarchical
conception of the federal judiciary, has been challenged by a number of scholars who
question hierarchy on both definitional and structural grounds. First, as a matter of
definition, these scholars argue that inferior courts were understood at the time of the
framing as courts of limited geographic jurisdiction.269 Supreme courts, by contrast, had
the power to exercise jurisdiction over disputes throughout the realm. On this view, one
cannot draw any firm limits from the terms supreme and inferior because supreme courts
had no special role to play with respect to lower or inferior courts, but simply provided a
geographically expansive court of original jurisdiction for the trial of substantial civil and
criminal matters. Others, such as Professor Amy Coney Barrett, have excavated
dictionaries and contemporary usage, concluding that, in general, supreme and inferior
often denoted rank or prestige rather than any sort of hierarchical relationship.270
Drawing a different lesson from the English model, Professor Edward Hartnett
has argued that the common law writs on which the Court of King’s Bench relied in
exercising supervisory oversight of lower courts outside the ordinary course of appellate
jurisdiction were distinctive features of a monarchical legal system.271 For Hartnett,
instead of being linked to supremacy and inferiority, the supervisory powers of the
English superior courts derived from their relationship to the royal prerogative and the
King’s power to administer justice throughout the realm. Hartnett further contends that
the republicans who framed Article III rejected the model of prerogative power in favor
of a model that emphasized the importance of written law.272 For Hartnett, then, the
English courts provide an example of what the framers rejected when they required
federal courts to act within boundaries set both by Article III and by acts of Congress
conferring and limiting jurisdiction.273
Second, proponents of limits on the Exceptions and Regulations Clause have run
up against the clause’s relatively obscure origins. Convention holds that, aside from the
text itself, interpretive guidance can be drawn only from a remarkably barren drafting
history.274 The clause first appeared rather late in the proceedings of the Committee of
Detail in a draft written by James Wilson. A prior draft, penned by committee member
John Rutledge, provided that “the legislature shall organize” the Supreme Court’s
original and appellate jurisdiction. Wilson rewrote Rutledge’s provision in a form
familiar to us from Article III: “In all the other Cases beforementioned, [the Court’s
jurisdiction] shall be appellate, with such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the
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Legislature shall make.”275 Until now, no other information about how the clause
originated has been discovered.
More fundamentally, as explained above, scholars have argued that there was
simply no model for a hierarchical, appellate-style supreme court at the time of the
framing. Professor Ritz, for example, points to the colonial and English models in
contending that hierarchical judicial systems were unknown in 1787–88.276 A similar
critique, albeit one addressed to the Hart-Ratner essential function thesis, is that
advocates for limits on Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping power confuse the familiar with
the constitutionally required.277 In mounting this critique at the essential function thesis,
Professor Gunther doubtless had two ideas in mind. First, Article III leaves a fair amount
of control over the structure of the federal judiciary in the hands of Congress. On this
view, the federal judiciary could have been structured in a variety of different ways.
Second, we have only come to rely on the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of the
meaning of federal law in comparatively recent times. The Court’s discretionary
jurisdiction (via the writ of certiorari) was conferred in the Judges’ Bill of 1925.278 What
Professors Hart and Ratner view as the Court’s essential function of settling the meaning
of federal law through discretionary review arrived rather late in its institutional history.
To insist that such discretionary oversight must be respected by Congress would
transform what has happened more or less by happenstance into a constitutional
requirement.279
As the following sections explain, however, our findings demonstrate that the
Scottish court system, as explained by Lord Kames and as immunized from
parliamentary tinkering in Article XIX of the Acts of Union, provides decisive support
for the hierarchical/subordinate position in this debate over definitions and precedents.
1.

Supremacy and Inferiority in the Scottish Courts

First, in addition to introducing the framers to a pyramidal and largely unified
court system, Kames’ Historical Law-Tracts provided the most complete exposition of
the correlative relationship of supreme and inferior courts available at the time of the
framing.280 According to Kames, a “supreme” court possessed several attributes. The
Court of Session, for example, enjoyed wide geographic and subject matter
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jurisdiction,281 which included the power to decide cases on equitable principles, a power
not necessarily conferred upon inferior courts. More importantly, however, a supreme
court was primarily defined by its ability to review the decrees of inferior courts:
The court of session is sovereign and supreme: sovereign, because it is the
King’s court, and it is the King who executes the acts and decrees of this
court: supreme, with respect to inferior courts having the same or part of
the same jurisdiction, but subjected to a review in this court.282
As Kames described it, the Session was supreme “with respect to” those courts whose
judgments it could review.
Kames extended this idea of oversight and control to his definition of inferior
courts; he characterized the decrees of inferior courts as subject to review by another
court. For example, Kames explained that, at one time, an aggrieved party could appeal a
decision of a baronial court to the sheriff court, making the baronial courts inferior to
their supervising sheriff court. But later, the appeal to the sheriff court gave way to
review by suspension and reduction in the Court of Session, at which point the sheriff
courts lost their supremacy over the baronial courts:
[T]his process of reduction, first practiced in the daily council, and
afterwards in the present court of session, put an end to the difference
betwixt the sheriff and baron courts in point of superiority. When appeals
went into disuse, the sheriff lost his power of reviewing the sentences of
the baron court; and these courts came by degrees to be considered as of
equal rank, when the proceedings of both were equally subjected to the
review of the court of session.283
Kames’ use of rank here also nicely resolves the textual ambiguity noted by Professor
Barrett and others by making clear that a court’s rank depended upon its place in the
chain of hierarchical review.
In the same discussion, Kames made clear that supremacy and inferiority were not
absolute, but were instead matters of relation.284 Thus, the High Court of Admiralty in
Scotland was a supreme court in relation to the inferior admiralty courts, but was an
inferior court in relation to the Court of Session (and to the High Court of Justiciary in
criminal causes) because its decrees were subject to review, either by appeal or by
suspension, reduction, or advocation:
The admiral court . . . is supreme with respect to inferior admiral courts,
whose sentences it can review. But with regard to the courts of session
and justiciary, it is an inferior court; because its decrees are subjected to a
review in these courts. The commissary [ecclesiastical] court of
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Edinburgh is properly the bishop’s court, and not sovereign. With respect
to its supremacy, it stands upon the same footing with the admiral court.285
A number of features of Historical Law-Tracts shed light on the contemporary
debate over the structural qualities of the federal courts. First, although the terms
“supreme” and “inferior” generally did denote—as some modern scholars have
contended—the breadth of a court’s geographic and subject matter jurisdiction, Scots
jurists viewed them primarily as indicative of a hierarchical relationship. Second, in
contrast with the views of scholars steeped in English precedents, Scottish authorities
viewed the power to supervise inferior courts as derived not from a supreme court’s
status as an arm of the king, but from its supremacy. Several Scottish courts were
sovereign, in the sense that they enjoyed broad territorial and subject matter jurisdiction,
but sovereignty did not confer powers of review. Indeed, as Kames explained, the Court
of Exchequer was a sovereign court, conducting the King’s business and hearing causes
from across Scotland,286 but it nevertheless was not a supreme court because it did not
review the judgments of any other courts.287 Third, a supreme court enjoyed wide powers
to administer justice that transcended the formal strictures ordinarily regulating the
exercise of judicial power at common law, namely, what Kames termed the nobile
officium, or equitable powers, of the Court of Session.
Scholars have attempted to reconstruct the meaning of the Constitution’s
reference to “one supreme Court” and “inferior” courts and tribunals from the
Westminster model, but Kames’ account reveals that they have been missing a key piece
of the framers’ understanding.288 Kames, supported by other Scottish legal writers, took
the position that a court was inferior only to those courts with the power to review its
decrees and stop its proceedings. Although Kames also embraced the geographic account
of inferiority, he did not regard geographical limits as the distinctive or defining feature
of an inferior court. The Acts of Union confirm the understanding that, at least in
Scotland, inferior courts were subordinate to the supreme court. Article XIX, as we have
seen, ensures the supremacy of the Courts of Session and Justiciary by declaring that “all
inferior Courts” within Scotland must “remain subordinate, as they are now,” to the
285
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“supream Courts of Justice within the same, in all time coming.” This requirement
provides striking support for Kames’ equation of supremacy with hierarchy and
inferiority with subordination. In addition, it placed an important and avowedly
permanent limitation upon the ability of Parliament to remove inferior jurisdictions from
the supervision and oversight of the Court of Session, the subject to which we now turn.
2.

Supervision in the Wake of Jurisdictional Exceptions and
Regulations

Second, the practice of the Court of Session under Article XIX of the Acts of
Union provides strikingly strong support for the supervisory account of Article III, allays
concerns with anachronism that now inform the jurisdiction-stripping debate, and helps to
explain the origins of the Exceptions and Regulations Clause. Recall that the Acts of
Union provided that the Court of Session would retain its current position and privileges
within the Scottish judicial system, but “subject nevertheless to such Regulations for the
better Administration of Justice, as shall be made by the Parliament of Great Britain.”
This clause has not been previously considered in the literature on the Constitution’s
Exceptions and Regulations Clause. But it bears an obvious resemblance to the
declaration in Article III that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction subject
only to “such exceptions, and under such regulations, as Congress shall make.” Given
the similarity of the operative language and Wilson’s Scottish roots, one can reasonably
infer that he drew the Clause, not out of thin air, but on the model of the judicial article of
the Acts of Union.
Indeed, at the same time that he was drafting the Exceptions and Regulations
Clause, Wilson inserted into what was to become Article I the provision granting
Congress the power to “constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,”289 a phrasing
conspicuously similar to the requirement in the Acts of Union that all inferior courts in
Scotland remain “subordinate . . . to the supream Courts of Justice.” The coincidence of
the two provisions in Wilson’s draft suggests a conscious attempt to institute a pyramidal
judicial framework, based on the Scottish design. While the similarity suggests
conscious borrowing, we do not think that an argument for the significance of the
Scottish model depends on proof that Wilson deliberately copied from the Acts of Union.
Plainly, the Scottish model provided the framers with a vocabulary and set of concepts
with which to implement the constitutional protections they sought to confer on the
federal judiciary. In addition, the Court of Session’s eighty years of experience with
regulations enacted pursuant to Article XIX would have shaped their understanding of
how the combined requirements of unity, supremacy, and inferiority in Article III limit
the exercise of the Exceptions and Regulations power.
As David Walker has noted, the seemingly innocuous regulations power in the
Acts of Union could allow Parliament to “fundamentally modify the powers and
functioning of a court.”290 But Parliament’s regulations power was subject to a crucial
limitation: the provision that inferior Scottish courts remain subordinate to the Court of
Session for all time coming. In Historical Law-Tracts, Lord Kames explained how the
Court of Session reconciled its supremacy with jurisdictional “regulations” imposed by
289
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Parliament. As with King’s Bench in England, the Court of Session reviewed the
judgments of inferior courts in a variety of ways, ranging from appeals to the issuance of
the extraordinary processes, in order to rectify error: “[J]udges subjected to no review
soon become arbitrary. Hence the necessity of superior courts, to review the proceedings
of those that are inferior.”291 Uniquely to Scotland, though, the practice of appeal as of
right had mostly given way by Kames’ time to the regular issuance of reduction,
suspension, and advocation, whose flexibility was preferable to the complexities of
appeals.292 In this function, the Court of Session used its supervisory powers to act as “a
compleat legal police,”293 one constituted in order to ensure the orderly administration of
justice.
Nevertheless, direct review on the merits in the Court of Session did not lie in
every case. The function of a supreme court, according to Kames, was not necessarily to
scrutinize every decision of an inferior court in every case for any sign of legal or factual
error, but rather to supervise those inferior courts in order to prevent them from
exceeding their powers or administering justice arbitrarily. As such, parliamentary
regulations often significantly curtailed the ability of litigants to secure review in the
Court of Session in the ordinary course. For a variety of reasons, Parliament used the
authority conferred upon it by the Acts of Union to provide for other tribunals to serve as
the exclusive and final jurisdictions in certain matters. But despite these declarations of
lower court finality, the Court of Session possessed the power by virtue of its supremacy
to interpose extraordinary supervisory remedies where necessary to keep inferior courts
within their proper bounds.
In some instances, the Court of Session exercised a confined appellate
jurisdiction, leaving closer supervision to an intermediate court. Although the Session
reviewed judgments in admiralty cases, for example, Parliament conferred on the High
Court of Admiralty “an exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance” in maritime cases.
Thus, the Court of Session refrained from direct supervision of the inferior admiral
courts, and acted only in an appellate function:
[W]ith relation to the [admiral court], the session at present cannot be
considered in any other light, than as a court of appeal; precisely as the
house of Lords is with relation to the session. Hence it seems to follow,
that the court of session cannot regularly suspend the decree of an inferior
admiral; which would be the same, as if a cause should be appealed from
the sheriff to the house of Lords.294
But when the admiral court heard mercantile cases not occurring directly on the high seas
(but related to merchant shipping295), its jurisdiction was an inferior one, supervised like
any inferior court by the Court of Session:
The court pretends not to an exclusive jurisdiction in mercantile affairs;
and in these it is precisely like the sheriff court, considered as an inferior
jurisdiction, subjected to the orders and review of the supreme court of

291

KAMES, supra note 8, at 316.
See KAMES, supra note 8, at 385–94.
293
KAMES, supra note 8, at 395.
294
KAMES, supra note 8, at 327–28.
295
See 5 WALKER, supra note 8, at 468–70.
292

51

session, by advocation, suspension, and reduction, in the ordinary
course.296
Note here that Kames distinguished between a court of appeal and a supreme court.
Although the Session heard appeals from the admiral court in maritime cases because the
admiral court possessed an exclusive jurisdiction, it was only in those mercantile cases in
which the Session exercised direct supervisory power that the admiral court was
considered “an inferior jurisdiction.” Indeed, Kames inserted the adjective “supreme”
when transitioning from the Session’s appellate to its supervisory function.
Conversely, the Court of Session also issued supervisory decrees in many
situations in which it lacked appellate jurisdiction. That practice emerged from the
complicated and vexatious nature of interlocutory appeals in Scotland in the fifteenth
century, which had to run through numerous courts and could multiply proceedings
indefinitely before eventually reaching the supreme court. According to Kames, the daily
council—the predecessor of the Session as the supreme civil court297—began reviewing
judgments of lower courts for error after aggrieved parties filed a direct complaint for
relief, though it did so without explicit statutory authority:
[C]omplaints were received against the proceedings and decrees of
inferior judges, and, upon iniquity found, . . . the proceedings were
rectified or annulled. The very nature and constitution of this court,
behoved to give birth to some such remedy . . . . This court could not
receive an appeal, because no such privilege was bestowed upon it; and
the whole forms of a process of appeal, were accurately adjusted by
parliament immediately after the institution of this court. Now, no man
who had once experienced an earlier remedy, would ever patiently submit
to the hardship and expence, of multiplying appeals through different
courts, before he could get his cause determined in the last resort. We
may therefore readily believe, that a direct application to the daily council
for redress, would be the choice of every man who conceived injustice to
be done him by an inferior judge. He could not bring his cause before this
court by appeal; which justified his bringing it by summons or complaint.
And in this form he had not any difficulty to struggle with, more than in an
appeal; for the former requires no antecedent authority from the court,
more than the latter. This assumed power of reviewing the decrees of
inferior judges, was soon improved into a more regular form. Decrees of
registration were from the beginning suspended and reduced in this court;
and by its very institution it was the proper court for such matters. The
same method came to be followed, in redressing iniquity committed by
inferior judges. In place of a complaint, a regular process of reduction
was brought; and because this process did not stay execution, the defect
was supplied by a suspension.298
As the supreme court, the daily council—and its later successor the Court of Session—
was “by its very nature and constitution” empowered to exercise supervisory authority in
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order to prevent inferior courts from exceeding their authority even in the absence of
statutorily vested as-of-right appellate jurisdiction.
More intriguingly, although the Session lacked a specific criminal jurisdiction,
during the development of the Scottish judicial system, the Session for a time interposed
itself where necessary to issue an advocation to inferior criminal courts, a power to which
the Justiciary had not yet succeeded:
The privilege of advocation, according to the established notion, was
confined to the court of session. The justiciary court did not pretend to
this privilege, and the court of session could not properly interpose in
matters which belonged to another supreme court. . . . The court of
session received complaints of wrong done by inferior criminal judges,
and upon finding a complaint well founded, took upon them to remove the
cause by advocation to the justiciary. They also ventured to remove the
criminal causes from one court, to another that was more competent and
unsuspected.299
In this example, the Session’s actions were even more notable than in the previous one,
for the court lacked eventual appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases. Thus, the court
assumed power only through its role as a supervisory court, but this time, instead of
removing the cause for its own determination, it transferred it for impartial adjudication
in the Justiciary.300
The Court of Session also entertained applications for extraordinary remedies to
supervise inferior courts even where another court possessed final power to determine a
case. Ecclesiastical courts, for example, were given the authority to pass an “ultimate”
sentence settling a minister in a parish, a decision with which the Session could not
interfere regardless of the lack of a minister’s legal entitlement to the position.301 “One
would imagine,” Kames explained, “that this should entitle him to the benefice or
stipend” of the office. Nevertheless, “the court of session, without pretending to deprive
a minister of his office, will bar him from the stipend, if the ecclesiastical court have
proceeded illegally in the settlement.”302 According to Kames, “it would be a great
defect in the constitution of a government, that ecclesiastical courts should have an
arbitrary power in providing parishes with ministers.”303 Thus, the Session interposed a
limited remedy to prevent such illegal proceedings without embroiling itself in the merits
of every dispute over the settlement of ministers: “The check is extremely mild, and yet is
fully effectual to prevent the abuse.”
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Most strikingly, the Court of Session actually addressed the consequences of an
act of Parliament restricting its appellate jurisdiction. In a decision with important, but
thus far unremarked implications for the jurisdiction stripping debate under Article III,
the Court of Session nonetheless upheld its supervisory authority. The case began with
Parliament’s adoption in 1749 of a statute authorizing certain trustees of a shire to
determine charges for tolls on a turnpike.304 This Turnpike Act also declared that the
justices of the peace would review the actions of the trustees, and could “rectify” any
abuses “ultimately and without appeal.”305 In the case of any pre-existing jurisdiction,
the established canon of construction was that the Session (as with King’s Bench in
England) would possess a power of review unless expressly excluded by the statute.306
As the Scottish jurist Erskine explained, “[t]he law is understood to confer a supreme and
sole jurisdiction only when the expression is so explicit to exclude all doubt, ex. gr. that
the court shall have power to determine without appeal, or that the judgment shall not be
subject to the review of any other court.”307
Even where Parliament provided for finality with respect to the Session’s
appellate jurisdiction, however, that finality extended only to the merits of the case, not to
review for excess of jurisdiction. Although the Court of Session lacked the power to
disturb the lower court’s judgment on the merits, it could still interpose to determine
whether the lower court had incorrectly determined the extent of its statutory jurisdiction,
perhaps by applying its power to a party or a situation outside the contemplation of the
statute: “A judgment however of a court upon its own powers, ought never, in good
policy, to be declared final; for this, in effect, would be to bestow upon the court,
however limited in its constitution, a power to arrogate to itself an unbounded
jurisdiction, which would be absurd.”308 Thus, despite the statutory vesting of finality in
the justices of the peace under the Turnpike Act, the Court of Session separated finality
as to the merits from finality as to the jurisdiction and maintained its supervisory role.309
Another manifestation of the idea that supervision survives a parliamentary
restriction on appellate jurisdiction appears in Countess of Loudon v. Trustees. In this
1792 case involving a different turnpike statute, a similar question arose as to meaning of
a provision that deemed the decisions of the quarter-sessions “final and conclusive.”310
The statute gave the local trustees the authority “to suppress any by-roads that do not
appear to be of importance to the public,” and vested final and conclusive appellate
jurisdiction in the court of quarter-sessions.311 After the trustees decided to close a
certain road, the Countess of Loudon petitioned the Court of Session for an advocation.
In determining that it possessed jurisdiction to review the judgment of the lower court,
the Court of Session distinguished between discretionary determinations committed to the
trustees, which were final, and determinations about the scope of the trustees’ power,
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which were not.312 And because the “Supreme Court” of Session had determined in a
previous decision that the road in question was in fact of importance to the public, the
trustees had exceeded their statutory authority by ignoring the Court of Session’s prior
decision.313 “In this way,” the Court explained, “the question of competency came to be
blended with the question of merits.”314
Countess of Loudon sheds important light on the flexible quality of supervisory
power and the importance of subordination as a defining feature of inferiority, both
considerations at the center of modern debates over jurisdiction stripping under Article
III. One centerpiece of the debate concerns the question whether Congress might free
inferior courts from any duty to apply the precedents of the Supreme Court by declaring
those precedents inapplicable and immunizing the lower courts from Supreme Court
review in the exercise of the Exceptions Clause.315 In Countess of Loudon, the Court of
Session indicated that the inferior court was bound to apply the decisions of its
hierarchical superior, and had no discretion to second-guess the Court’s prior judgment
about the importance of the road. Viewing itself as duty-bound to interpose to correct
that error, the Court of Session treated the parliamentary limit on its appellate jurisdiction
as inapplicable to its supervisory role. Even though the error did not implicate the lower
court’s jurisdiction, it threatened to upend the hierarchical relationship specified in the
Acts of Union and thus required correction. Indeed, the Court of Session intimated that
the vesting of final and conclusive jurisdiction on all points in an inferior court “might
even be held to be in some measure unconstitutional.”316
An incident that occurred shortly after Countess of Loudon confirms that the
Scottish courts viewed the protections of the Acts of Union as an affirmative check upon
parliamentary regulations. In their 1807 Memorial to the House of Lords, the Senators of
the College of Justice (which consisted of the Lords of Session and other high-ranking
members of the Scottish judiciary) argued that some contemplated reforms of the Court
of Session might contravene the protections of Article XIX:
We are of opinion that on fair bona fide construction, as between two
independent nations, it cannot be held to have been in the contemplation
of either, that any law should, in future times, be considered as merely a
regulation for the better administration of justice which goes to subvert the
supreme jurisdiction of the Court of Session, and to render it subordinate
to a new court, unknown to our ancestors.317
It appears, moreover, that Parliament took this admonition to heart in crafting subsequent
legislation.
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Historical Law-Tracts and Countess of Loudon suggest that the supervisory
account of Article III, far from being an anachronism, actually gives voice to a model of
supremacy and inferiority that was widely understood in the eighteenth century and
employed in the Constitution. The Court of Session saw no threat to its supremacy in
routine exceptions to its power of review, or to the vesting of final jurisdiction over
factual decisions in inferior courts. In addition, it was content to let intermediate
courts—such as the High Court of Admiralty—handle the supervision of much judicial
business in the first instance. Notwithstanding Parliament’s regulations, however, the
Court of Session ensured the uniformity of the law, the status of its precedents, and the
orderly administration of justice through limited interventions on jurisdictional grounds,
thereby preventing inferior courts from escaping their subordinate status and using
legislative exceptions to accumulate an unbounded jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
Scholarship on the origins of Article III of the Constitution and the meaning of the
judicial power of the United States has often drawn on what Justice Frankfurter called the
“traditional” work of the courts of Westminster. In an effort to understand English legal
traditions, scholars have invariably turned to Blackstone’s Commentaries as the best
digested summary of English law. But just as Thomas Jefferson feared Blackstone’s
influence on the sons and daughters of the nation’s founders, so too has Blackstone
captivated the scholarly gaze of subsequent generations. England’s jurists aspired to a
hierarchy that their judicial system did not achieve; it featured multiple superior courts
with overlapping jurisdiction, without one supreme court to oversee the work of all
subordinate inferior tribunals. Relying on the English model, critics argue that our
supervisory account of Article III simply lacks historical precedent and may suffer from
anachronism. For critics steeped in Blackstone, the crucial terms of Article III—unity,
supremacy, and inferiority—invite argument about the degree to which Congress must
create and respect a judicial hierarchy with ultimate oversight over law, equity, and
admiralty vested in the Supreme Court. Supremacy conveys conflicting meanings and
the judicial hierarchy that now characterizes the Article III judiciary might appear to have
emerged by accident, rather than by design.
We think that quite the contrary is true. Drawing on the Scottish example of a
unitary judicial system operating within a constitutional framework that qualified
parliamentary control, we think the framers deliberately chose a system of judicial
hierarchy and supervision and rejected the vision of plenary congressional control on
which orthodox accounts depend. The Scottish model of a unitary judicial system,
familiar to the framers and quite different from the English model of multiplicity,
provides important support for our supervisory account, and answers both Professor
Engdahl’s critique that the framers did not understand supremacy to denote hierarchy,
and Professor Hartnett’s critique that supervisory authority is a monarchical vestige that
contradicts a republican government predicated upon written law. The evidence of
Scottish influence on those who structured Article III plainly demonstrates that the
framers had available to them a fully formed model of a unitary judicial system,
implemented through a system of supervisory review that clearly defined one supreme
court (the Court of Session) and imposed obligations of subordination on all inferior
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courts. Rather than one we moderns have imposed on them, we think the hierarchical
conception of Article III was one the framers borrowed from Scotland, extended, and
projected into the future.
We believe the Scottish model has important lessons to teach, not only about the
many influences on the founding generation but also about the way knowledgeable
lawyers would have understood the operation of Article III’s Exceptions and Regulations
clause. Just as the Acts of Union protected the privileges and authority of the Court of
Session from parliamentary remodeling, so too did Article III secure the judicial power
and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Just as the Acts of Union contemplated that
Parliament would make routine housekeeping regulations, so too did Article III authorize
exceptions and regulations to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to provide for the more
convenient administration of justice. Just as the Session’s power to supervise inferior
courts was understood to survive any parliamentary restrictions on its appellate
jurisdiction, so too does the Supreme Court’s spot-checking supervisory authority
necessarily survive any congressional exceptions to its as-of-right appellate jurisdiction.
Scottish law, so familiar to revolutionary Americans, left very few traces upon the
American common law norms that developed in the nineteenth century under the
stewardship of Joseph Story and James Kent. Blackstone’s emergence and the
Commentaries’ influence on the education of young lawyers helped to fuel the
widespread adoption of English law (even in Scotland). Yet the absence of Scottish
influence on nineteenth-century American legal education and the rules of contract, tort,
and property law should not be read to mean that the Scots example was entirely lost on
early Americans. Indeed, we believe the Scottish judiciary had its most profound impact
in providing a model for the structure of the federal judiciary, with its one Supreme Court
sitting atop a judicial pyramid consisting of a multitude of inferior tribunals. If it
contributed little to the common law of the early Republic, the Scottish judicial system as
secured through the Acts of Union remains embossed in Article III and in the features of
unity, hierarchy, finality, and independence that define the federal judiciary.
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APPENDIX
Article XIX of the Acts of Union
That the Court of Session or Colledge of Justice, do after the Union and notwithstanding
thereof, remain in all time coming within Scotland as it is now constituted by the Laws of
that Kingdom, and with the same Authority and Priviledges as before the Union; subject
nevertheless to such Regulations for the better Administration of Justice as shall be made
by the Parliament of Great Britain; And that hereafter none shall be named by Her
Majesty or Her Royal Successors to be Ordinary Lords of Session but such who have
served in the Colledge of Justice as Advocats or Principal Clerks of Session for the space
of five years, or as Writers to the Signet for the space of ten years With this provision
That no Writer to the Signet be capable to be admitted a Lord of the Session unless he
undergo a private and publick Tryal on the Civil Law before the Faculty of Advocats and
be found by them qualified for the said Office two years before he be named to be a Lord
of the Session, yet so as the Qualifications made or to be made for capacitating persons to
be named Ordinary Lords of Session may be altered by the Parliament of Great Britain.
And that the Court of Justiciary do also after the Union, and notwithstanding thereof
remain in all time coming within Scotland, as it is now constituted by the Laws of that
Kingdom, and with the same Authority and Priviledges as before the Union; subject
nevertheless to such Regulations as shall be made by the Parliament of Great Britain, and
without prejudice of other Rights of Justiciary:
And that all Admiralty Jurisdictions be under the Lord High Admirall or Commissioners
for the Admiralty of Great Britain for the time being; And that the Court of Admiralty
now Established in Scotland be continued, And that all Reviews, Reductions or
Suspensions of the Sentences in Maritime Cases competent to the Jurisdiction of that
Court remain the the same manner after the Union as now in Scotland, until the
Parliament of Great Britain shall make such Regulations and Alterations, as shall be
judged expedient for the whole United Kingdom, so as there be alwayes continued in
Scotland a Court of Admiralty such as in England, for determination of all Maritime
Cases relating to private Rights in Scotland competent to the Jurisdiction of the
Admiralty Court; subject nevertheless to such Regulations and Alterations as shall be
thought proper to be made by the Parliament of Great Britain; And that the Heritable
Rights of Admiralty and Vice-Admiralties in Scotland be reserved to the respective
Proprietors as Rights of Property, subject nevertheless, as to the manner of Exercising
such Heritable Rights to such Regulations and Alterations as shall be thought proper to be
made by the Parliament of Great Britain;
And that all other Courts now in being within the Kingdom of Scotland do remain, but
subject to Alterations by the Parliament of Great Britain; And that all Inferior Courts
within the said Limits do remain subordinate, as they are now to the Supream Courts of
Justice within the same in all time coming;
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And that no Causes in Scotland be cognoscible by the Courts of Chancery, QueensBench, Common-Pleas, or any other Court in Westminster-hall; And that the said Courts,
or any other of the like nature after the Union, shall have no power to Cognosce, Review
or Alter the Acts or Sentences of the Judicatures within Scotland, or stop the Execution of
the same;
And that there be a Court of Exchequer in Scotland after the Union, for deciding
Questions concerning the Revenues of Customs and Excises there, having the same
power and authority in such cases, as the Court of Exchequer has in England And that the
said Court of Exchequer in Scotland have power of passing Signatures, Gifts Tutories,
and in other things as the Court of Exchequer in Scotland hath; And that the Court of
Exchequer that now is in Scotland do remain, until a New Court of Exchequer be settled
by the Parliament of Great Britain in Scotland after the Union;
And that after the Union the Queens Majesty and Her Royal Successors, may Continue a
Privy Council in Scotland, for preserving of public Peace and Order, until the Parliament
of Great Britain shall think fit to alter it or establish any other effectual method for that
end.
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